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THE SURPRISING EQUALITY OF RETIREMENT TIME:
EVIDENCE FROM THE HEALTH AND RETIREMENT SURVEY
ANTHONY BONEN*
TERESA GHILARDUCCI**
***
This article discusses the impact changes to the retirement age may have
on the distribution of retirement time. The author investigates the length of
time men and women are alive between the date of their retirement and
their death, finding that the most critical factor in determining length of
retirement time is and individual’s socio-economic status. As a result, the
author opines that because individuals in lower economic classes tend to
die earlier, increasing the retirement age will impact these individuals
disproportionally and increase retirement time inequality.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012, economic inequality in the United States reached its
highest level in 100 years.1 Increasingly, inequality is considered by global
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Professor of Economic Policy Analysis and Chair of Economics Department, and
corresponding author.
1
Every year from 1913 to 2012 (the earliest and latest years for which data is
available) the top 10%, 1% and 0.1% of income earners won a greater share of
national 2012-value-income than in any previous year (this is true whether one
includes or excludes capital gains). See Facundo Alvaredo et al., The Database,
THE WORLD TOP INCOMES DATABASE, http://topincomes.gmond.parisschool
ofeconomics.eu/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (accessed by selecting the “The
Database” link and then selecting the corresponding country and years). Census
data for the Gini coefficient (which is negatively related with the degree of
equality) has steadily increased since 1967 when records began. In 2012 (and
2011) the Gini coefficient was 0.477 – roughly equal to the Gini measure of
inequality for Singapore, Kenya, and the Dominican Republic. See Historical
Income Tables: Households tbl.H-4, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.
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economic and financial leaders to be the principal barrier to economic
growth.2 However, the disparity of wealth and income do not alone convey
the deepening stratification of American society. An equally important
dimension of well-being is access to time at the end of a person’s working
life. We identify “retirement time” as a resource that employees consume
after permanently exiting the labor market. Retirement time is simply the
time between retiring and dying: the difference between the age at death
and the age at the start of retirement. Upper income individuals live longer
than lower income workers and the longevity gap has grown wider by
socio-economic status (SES) over time.3 We expect the growing inequality
of longevity due to SES, coupled with the increasing effort that lowerincome older people are making to stay in the labor force, will cause
retirement time to become more unequally distributed between SES groups.
A growing time-inequality should be avoided because retirement time is
one of the only areas where the nation has made significant progress
achieving equality among working people.4
On average, Americans over age sixty-five are living longer, but
longevity gains are unequally distributed between people of different races,
between men and women, and among those of different socio-economic
status.5 For example, white men’s longevity at age seventy-five increased
25% between 1980 and 2000, whereas black men’s increase in life
expectancy at age seventy-five grew by 22.9% over the same time period.6
gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/ (follow “Table H-4” hyperlink)
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
2
See Larry Elliot, Income Gap Poses Biggest Threat to Global Community,
Warns WEF, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 16, 2014, available at http://www.the guardian
.com/business/2014/jan/16/income-gap-biggest-risk-global-community-worldeconomic-forum.
3
That is, not only has income and wealth grown wider, so too has the gap in
longevity. See Julian P. Cristia, Rising Mortality and Life Expectancy Differentials
by Lifetime Earnings in the United States, (Inter-American Dev. Bank, Working
Paper No. 665, 2009); Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2007, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN STATISTICS NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Sept. 28, 2011, at 48.
4
See infra App. A.
5
NAT’L INST. ON AGING, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH
PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, GROWING OLDER IN AMERICA: THE HEALTH & RET. STUDY
20 (2007).
6
Number of years expected to live from age seventy-five onwards is 10.1 and
12.5 years respectively for white males and females, and 11.7 and 14.1 years
respectively for black males and females. See infra App. A.
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But small differences in rates of change compound over time. The
white/black gap in age seventy-five life expectancy in 2010 was only nine
months. If trends continue however, in twenty years the difference will be
over one year and three months. Though longevity is on track to become
more unequal, analysis of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 7
demonstrates that retirement time is still remarkably equal among the last
generation of workers – our current retirees – primarily because lower
income people tend to retire earlier.
While retirement time had been an equalizing asset between
members of different income classes,8 there is nascent evidence that the
distribution of retirement time may become more unequal.9 Income, of
course, is not the only factor driving the distribution of retirement time.
Not surprisingly, healthier individuals consume more retirement time
because they live longer.9 Further, although it was not expected, men have
more retirement time than women who have retired.10 Also unexpected is
that since lower income workers retire earlier than higher income workers,
the lower income groups have, on average, more retirement time. 11
However, these results are reversed among middle class elderly persons
(i.e., among the group excluding retirees in the top 20% and bottom 20% of
the income distribution). 12 When focusing on the middle 60% of the
distribution, there is evidence that retirement time inequality may be on the
rise.13
Retirement time inequality will also likely increase as a result of
the continuing weakness of the U.S. labor market as older workers
(especially those with less income) work, or search for work, later into life
than previous cohorts. We also expect, as the panel grows larger, the bias
in the data set (containing a disproportionate share of people who die
earlier than normal) will dissipate. The HRS panel data has only a small

7

See infra note 41.
Although SES is the key conceptual division, we will avoid the
complications of defining precise SES criteria and instead focus simply on fulltime labor market income as a rough proxy for SES.
9
See NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 5660.
9
Id. at 40.
10
Id. at 22, 35, 40.
11
Id. at 51-65.
12
Id.
13
NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 51-65.
8
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number of respondents who have died after living an average life span,14
which means the sample is not perfectly representative of the population.
However, the large sample currently available is representative in some key
dimensions, such as health status. Despite the limitations in the data, we
find support for the hypothesis that the distribution of retirement time
remains relatively equal because upper-middle class income men work
longer and retire at older ages. However, there is nascent evidence that this
equity is eroding.
Retirement time inequality should inform policies concerning the
appropriate “normal retirement age” in Social Security, Medicare, and
other old age programs. If benefits are cut by raising the age participants
can collect full benefits, then lower income workers will likely work later
into life, eroding their retirement time relative to wealthier and/or healthier
individuals. To date, the nation’s old age programs are among the few
mechanisms that mitigate the impacts of deepening inequality of wealth,
income, opportunity and mortality in the United States.
II.

RETIREMENT IN AMERICA – BACKGROUND AND
RECENT FINDINGS

Since the 1950s, the labor force participation of men over age fifty
declined across all income groups as the expansion of Social Security made
retirement income more equally distributed than preretirement income.15
Defined benefit (DB) pension plans were more prevalent in jobs that were
physically taxing, so those with lower than average longevity were able to
retire sooner.16 This recent success in achieving some equity in retirement
time stems from the design of the American retirement and disability
income system, which has its roots in social systems developed for state
and municipal employees at the turn of the last century.17 These systems
were extended to most private sector workers with the adoption of Social

14

Id.
Edward N. Wolff, Pensions in the 2000s: The Lost Decade? (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16991, 2011), available at http://www.nber
.org/papers/w16991.
16
NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 51.
17
See ROBERT L. CLARK ET AL., A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1, 167-71 (2003).
15
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Security in 1935.18 More workers were able to retire when Social Security
old age benefits and disability programs expanded significantly from the
1950s through to the 1970s. 19 This came with the coincident growth of
unions and employer-based DB pension plans in the 1940s and continuing
until the 1970s. 20 Further, Medicare was established in 1965, providing
universal health insurance for those over age sixty-five, which significantly
improved the health and longevity of the aged. 21 As a result of these
changes, workers in all socioeconomic groups were able to control some of
their own leisure time before they died.
In 2008, Teresa Ghilarducci was the first scholar to measure the
distribution of retirement time, finding that the distribution of retirement
time was strikingly equal for people who died before age sixty-five. 22
Relying on the 2006 HRS sample, Ghilarducci found that the top incomeearning quintile of retirees between ages fifty and sixty-five had
approximately the same share of retirement time as the other four quintiles
in the same age range.23 The analysis added together retirement times of
these retirees before age sixty-five and then found each quintile’s relative
share of the total sum of retirement time.24 The top quintile accounted for
their proportionate share of retirement time consumed before the age of
sixty-five. Specifically, retired men in the top 20% of the asset distribution
– those with assets worth over $271,000 – had 5.57 years of retirement time
before the age of sixty-five and accounted for 22% of the total amount of
retirement time.25 Men in the bottom 20% – those with an average debt of
$6,000 – accounted for 18% of the total retirement time before the age of
sixty-five.26 Furthermore, Ghilarducci noted that although the top 20% of
the men had 85% of all the wealth and the poorest 20% were in debt, the
distribution of retirement time before age sixty-five was almost equal.27 For

18

See Patricia P. Martin & David A. Weaver, Social Security: A Program &
Policy History, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1, 1-3 (2005).
19
Id. at 1, 7-9.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 8.
22
See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST
PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 200-01 (2008).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 200.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 201.
27
Ghilarducci, supra note 22, at 201.

410

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.2

women the distribution of pre-sixty-five retirement time was also equal.28
The top and bottom fifths of women accounted for the same share of
retirement time – 22.6% for the top and 22.7% for the bottom.29
Furthermore, Ghilarducci found that women and men, blacks and
whites, high and low income, have approximately the same amount of
retirement time prior to age sixty-five. 30 She argued retirement time is
distributed relatively equally because in the United States the “retirement
date” is flexible. 31 Many defined benefit plans allow pension collection
before age sixty-two, when workers become eligible for early Social
Security benefits. 32 Similarly, Social Security and workplace disability
pensions are available before age sixty-two for eligible workers (albeit at
the cost of reduced benefits).33 In some pension plans, American workers
can start collecting a defined benefit pension as early as age fifty.34
Because age discrimination is illegal in the United States,35 many
older workers are able to stay in the labor market beyond age sixty-five.36
Since professionals are likely to work later into life than blue-collar
workers,37 a retirement system can be more balanced and fair even in the
face of longevity differences among social economic classes. In fact,
pension systems that allow and encourage people who die sooner than
average to retire sooner than average – Social Security and DB pensions
have these features38 – are potentially very progressive. If people who die
earlier also retire at younger ages they could conceivably have the same
amount of retirement time as higher-income people who live longer. In
contrast, 401(k)-type pensions (defined contribution (DC) pensions)
accumulate significantly as a person ages and pays out lump sums so that
retiring earlier is often difficult for lower income individuals. 39 Finally,
people without employer-based pensions or independent assets would need
to work longer, as they can rely only on Social Security benefits. Workers
28

Id.
Id.
30
Id. at 214.
31
Id. at 215.
32
NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 57-62.
33
Id. at 62.
34
Id.
35
29 U.S.C. § 623 (2008).
36
Id.
37
NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757 supra note 5, at 43-44.
38
Id. at 51.
39
Id.
29

2014

THE SURPRISING EQUALITY OF RETIREMENT TIME

411

in such situations are predominantly low-income earners with shorter life
spans. As DC plans replace traditional DB pensions and as coverage by
any employer based retirement plan has stagnated, 40 one of the key
equalizing mechanisms of the American retirement system will be lost.
III.

HRS DATA ON RETIREMENT TIME DISTRIBUTION AND
METHODOLOGY41

HRS is administered by the University of Michigan every two
years as a series of in-depth interviews with people age fifty and over.42
The first cohort began in 1992 and included more than 10,000
respondents.43 The latest available survey is data from 2010.44 Our sample
comes from each of the ten surveys. Every sixth year (or third survey), the
HRS adds approximately 5,000 new participants in order to maintain a
sample. 45 The panel nature of the HRS data is essential to determining
individuals’ time spent in retirement since we need to know the year and
month of both retirement and of death. The key variable, retirement time,
is measured as the difference between the respondent’s year of death and
year of retirement, plus the numeric difference between her or his month of
death and the month of retirement where months are coded sequentially,
with January equal to one and December equal to twelve.46

40

Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation:
Geographic Differences and Trends, 2011, 378 EMP. BEN. RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF
1, 26, 36 (2012), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB _112012_No378_RetParticip.pdf.
41
Health and Retirement Study, U. MICHIGAN, http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.; Sample Sizes and Response Rates, U. MICHIGAN,
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/sitedocs/sampleresponse.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
46
This coding pattern assumes that reported dates occur at the end of the
reported month. Alternatively, one could code months as January = 0, February =
1, … December = 11. The reported result would not differ.
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(1)
12

Defining the start of retirement can be difficult since many people
continue to work, volunteer, or do other activities after they leave a longterm career. Judging what is or is not retirement from work is difficult.
We use HRS respondents’ own declaration of whether or not they are
retired. Specifically, the survey asks respondents if they are retired,
disabled or working, and the date of their retirement. 47 However, if an
individual reports she is retired in 1994, working in 1996, and then retired
again in 1998, equation (1) uses her most recent statement of retirement
year and retirement month (i.e., whatever year and month she states in the
1998 survey wave).
To calculate retirement and death ages, we use a similar formula as
(1). We calculate individuals’ age of retirement based on their latest
answer to their year/month of retirement by subtracting the respondent’s
year and month of birth.

12

(2)

12
Finally we compute age at death with a similar subtraction:

12

(3)

12

47

Health and Retirement Study, supra note 41; 2010 Questionnaire, U.
MICHIGAN, http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/modules/meta/2010/core/qnaire/ online
/10hr10JCore.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
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Once these core values are computed, we restrict the data set to
respondents who report at least one instance of full-time labor market
income.48 In addition to dividing the sample of 12,033 respondents by their
labor market status, this restriction ensures that we analyze the retirement
patterns of workers. Since workers report labor market income in various
years, we adjust all values to 2008 dollars according to the Census
Bureau’s consumer price index (CPI) for the appropriate year. 49 After
adjusting for inflation, we calculate each respondent’s mean full-time
income. Thus, if a respondent reports full-time income in only one survey
year, this amount is his average real income; if a respondent reports fulltime income in three separate surveys her average real income is one-third
of the sum of the adjusted values.
The sample sizes for retirement time, retirement age and death age
are different because more respondents (5,557) consider themselves retired
(and provide the interviewer with a valid retirement year and month) than
have died. Since the first HRS wave was in 1992, and the latest available
data is from 2010, the youngest respondent would be fifty years old (the
age one enters the HRS) plus eighteen years, or sixty-eight years old. This
limitation leads to a much smaller number of observed death ages (1,418)
since these individuals must have reported at least one year of full-time
labor market income before retiring and dying. However, since many
respondents may have worked and died without ever retiring, the number
of those with a retirement time is about half of those with a death age.50
A. DOWNWARD LONGEVITY BIAS
Because the survey is only eighteen years old, the majority of
respondents are still alive. Due to this, we cannot know living retirees’
total retirement time, which creates a bias in our data set because less than
12% (1,418/12,033 = 11.7%) of the eligible sample are deceased. Among
48

We define full-time labor market attachment as respondents who described
the “usual” working time as at least thirty-five hours per week and “usual” work
frequency as forty weeks per year.
49
See Minn. Population Ctr., Univ. of Minn., Note on Adjusting Dollar
Amount Variables for Inflation (CPI-U), IPUMS-CPS, https://cps.ipums.org/cps/
intro.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (“The IPUMS variable CPI99 provides an
easy way to adjust dollar amounts to constant dollars”).
50
An individual could also have no measured retirement time because not all
the necessary data points (year of death, month of death, year of retirement and
month of retirement) were recorded, so retirement time was not computed.

414

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.2

the deceased, only half (725/1,418 = 51.3%) have a corresponding
retirement date by which retirement time can be calculated. The resulting
problem is a downward bias in longevity as shown by the low mean death
age of 67.9 in our sample. Therefore, the results reported here must be
recognized as representing an unfortunate (early death) subgroup of the
population. Key variables are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Sample Summary for HRS Respondents with Some Full-Time
Income
Standard
Observations
Mean Value
Deviation
Total Number of
12,033
Respondents
Death Age

1,418

67.86

7.57

Retirement Age

5,557

62.10

5.57

Retirement Time

725

8.71

5.68

Average Real
Income (FullTime)

12,033

$51,173

$58,550

Employing different techniques or restrictions to correct for the
downward bias in death age, however, does not alter the central results of
our analysis. One method is restricting the sample to respondents aged
sixty or older when they first entered the HRS. To partially mitigate the
large reduction in sample size of this approach we drop the full-time
restriction on labor market income. These two changes generate a sample
of approximately 3,100 – about one-quarter the size of our chosen sample.
The benefit of this smaller sample is that the downward longevity bias is
largely removed as the average age of death increases from 67.9 to 77.4,
which is comparable to this generation’s expected longevity. 51 However,
not only does this approach require an arbitrary age cut off, but the
inclusion of part-time income greatly skews the average real income

51

The current longevity estimate for those born in the 1930s is 83.8 years.
See generally Arias, supra note 3, at 48.
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variable downward.52 Therefore, correcting for one skew in the sample’s
distribution introduces another, but at the additional cost of many lost
observations.
Yet, in spite of these imposed restrictions, the overall results did
not substantially change: men still had more retirement time than women,
working men retired earlier than working women, and having a pension
continues to appear to have little impact on retirement time. Moreover,
retirement time in the restricted sample is still negatively related to income
overall, but it is positively correlated among the middle 60% of the
distribution. Therefore, given the larger, non-arbitrary and more robust
results of the sample presented in Table 1, as well as the importance of fulltime labor market income to proxy socio-economic status, we proceed with
the analysis acknowledging the downward longevity bias and eagerly await
more waves of the HRS.
B. RETIREMENT DISTRIBUTION BY DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC
CATEGORIES
In our sample, 725 people retired and died with an average
retirement time of 8.7 years. This group retired at ages 4.5 months (0.38 of
a year) older than the average of all the 5,557 retirees. Table 2 displays
retirement age, death age and retirement time by sex, race, pension
coverage, and health status. The subgroup sizes are listed below the mean
value. The last column reports the retirement age of those who died, which
are the individuals for whom we calculate their retirement time.

52

Approximately one-third of this sample of persons aged sixty or older had
an annual labor market income of under $4,500 since, in this case, labor market
income is not restricted to full-time workers.
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Table 2: Retired, Deceased and Retirement Time Averages by Demographics
Subgroups

All
Women
Men
Nonwhite
White
No Pension in
1992
Has Pension in
1992
Health: Good
to Poor
Health:
Excellent to
Very Good

Retirement
Age

Death Age

Retirement
Time

62.10

67.86

8.715

5,557

1,418

725

62.05

66.86

8.46

2,535

475

216

62.14

68.37

8.823

3,022

943

509

61.6

66.61

9.111

1,002

285

141

62.2

68.18

8.619

4,555

1,133

584

63.21

68.2

8.325

986

342

173

62.05

67.93

8.431

2,755

627

393

62.02

67.30

8.454

2,319

800

397

62.15

68.59

9.03

3,238

618

328

Retirement
Age
(Deceased)
62.48
62.75
62.37
61.02
62.83

63.38

61.74

62.44
62.52

Although men and women retire at roughly the same age (62.14
and 62.05, respectively), the 509 retired men who died had over four extra
months of retirement time than did the 216 deceased women (8.82 versus
8.46, respectively) because the men lived longer than the women who
retired. Also surprising, the non-white workers have half a year more of
retirement time than white workers (9.11 versus 8.62) because they retired
earlier, at age 61.6 compared to 62.2. Since the number of observations
differs for each variable, Table 2 lists the subgroup sizes below each
group’s mean value. The last column reports the retirement age of those
who have died, which are the individuals for whom we calculate retirement
time.

2014

THE SURPRISING EQUALITY OF RETIREMENT TIME

417

The difference in retirement age and death age between those with
and without pensions was not significant. Those without pensions had, on
average, 8.32 years of retirement time compared to 8.43 years for those
with access to pensions – a difference of about five weeks. 53 Not
surprisingly those with self-described ‘excellent’ or ‘very good’ health had
a mean 9.03 years in retirement time, whereas those with ‘good’, ‘fair’ or
‘poor’ health had only 8.45 years of retirement time on average.54 Since the
healthy and less healthy have approximately the same retirement age (62.52
and 62.44, respectively), the difference in retirement time comes entirely
from the healthier group’s longer-than-average lifespan (68.59 versus
67.30).
Now that we have presented differences by race, sex and health, we
examine two income categories:
(i)
(ii)

Respondents with income above and below the median fulltime labor market income $40,000, and;
Respondents groups by full-time average real income
quintiles.55

The bottom 50% of income earners had an average retirement time
of 9 years, which is significantly greater than the top half’s retirement time
of 8.3 years, or 8.4 months more retirement time enjoyed by the lower
income half of retired workers, as can be seen in Table 3. Table 3 shows
that this negative relation between income and retirement time is driven, to
a significant extent, by the top and bottom quintiles which have an average
of 7.4 and 10.2 years of retirement, respectively. These extreme
differences are not apparent between the second, third and fourth quintiles,
which have retirement times of 8.4, 8.2 and 8.9 years, respectively. These
stark differences in retirement time are discussed further below, but first we
53

Although restricting this part to individuals in the 1992 HRS reduces our
potential sample size, for these rows, only a very few individuals not in the 1992
wave have pensions in later waves and have a valid retirement time. Thus, the
substantive results are not affected by this restriction.
54
The HRS question regarding personal health status is asked of each
respondent in each wave. We have relied on an individual’s first reported personal
health status – making it perhaps even more surprising that there is such a large
division between the self-assessed healthy and unhealthy. We collapse the HRS’s
five categories into a binary one for ease of analysis.
55
The minimum average annual incomes to be included in each quintile are
$0, $21,906.64, $33,362.48, $47,328.59 and $69,543.62.
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consider the distribution of retirement time among income groups of men
and women separately.
Table 3: Retired, Deceased and Retirement Time Averages by Income
Groups
Subgroups

Lower Half of
Incomes
Upper Half of
Incomes

Bottom 20%
20-40%
40-60%
60-80%
Top 20%

Retirement
Age

Death Age Retirement
Time

62.55

68.27

9.04

Retirement
Age
(Deceased)
62.86

2,668
61.67

776
67.37

384
8.348

62.05

2,889

642

62.84

62.4

69.04

341
10.16

1,065

340

164

62.52

68.02

8.367

1,070

293

145

62.61

67.21

8.229

1,106

297

152

61.32

67.41

8.934

1,235

279

153

61.74

67.27

7.393

1,081

209

111

63.22
62.68
61.36
62.25

We find lower-income women and men retire at approximately the
same age, 62.50 and 62.63, respectively. While there is a larger gap
(approximately seven months) between the retirement ages of higherincome women (61.27) and men (61.87), higher earning individuals of both
sexes retire at earlier ages than their lower-income counterparts, as shown
in Table 4. Yet, this equality between the sexes in retirement age does not
carry over into retirement time. Both upper- and lower-income women –
for whom we can determine retirement time – have almost identical
amounts of retirement time: 8.46 and 8.45 years, respectively.56 However,

56

It must be noted that at this level of data, parsing our cell counts (i.e., the
number of observations per variable type) are approaching the limit of what can be
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higher income men have nearly one year less of retirement time than lower
income men. The 281 higher-income males have an average of 8.33 years
of retirement, whereas the 228 lower-income males have 9.43 years. Thus,
in contrast to our initial expectations, among retired workers, retirement
time is not positively correlated with labor market income. However, as
demonstrated in Table 5, the “reverse inequality” result (i.e., the poor have
more) is driven by including the richest and poorest quintiles of retired
men.
Table 4: Retirement Age and Time by Sex and Income Group
Women
Income Class

Men
Upper
Income

Lower
Income

Upper
Income

Lower
Income

1,596

939

1,072

1,950

Mean Retirement Age 62.50

61.27

62.63

61.87

Obs. Retirement Time 156

60

228

281

62.46

62.86

61.96

8.450

9.434

8.327

No. Retired

Mean Retirement Age
62.86
if Deceased
Mean Retirement
8.464
Time

Restricting the sample to the middle 60% of the income
distribution yields a different income and retirement time relationship than
in the full sample. Table 5 presents the same data as Table 4, but with the
sample restricted to the middle 60% of the income distribution. In the
middle class, the lower income women work for a longer period of time:
women in the lower half of the middle class retiree distribution retire a full
year later than the upper middle-income class women (62.4 years versus
61.4 years). For men, the 1.2 years gap is even larger. Lower-income,
middle class men work until nearly age 63 and upper-income middle class
men retire at age 61.8 years. Furthermore, the difference in retirement time
is positively related to income. Men in the 50th to 80th percentile range
considered useful. The smallest cell counts are 60 and 49, which demand one to
extrapolate the results with much caution.
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have about 8.8 years of retirement, and their counterparts in the 20th to
50th percentile range have less time in retirement, at an average of 8.5
years. Therefore, the negative relationship between retirement time and
income class shown in Table 3 is driven entirely by the top 20% and
bottom 20% of male income earners.
Table 5: Middle Income Retirees -- 60% of Distribution -Retirement Age and Time by Gender and Income Group
Binary Income Class

Women
Lower
Income

Upper
Income

Men
Lower
Income

Upper
Income

No. Retired

920

716

683

1,092

Mean Retirement Age

62.42

61.41

62.98

61.78

Obs. Retirement Time

85

49

135

181

62.54

62.48

63.08

61.81

7.727

8.825

8.503

8.805

Mean Retirement Age
if Deceased
Mean Retirement
Time

We conclude that the anomalous results of retirement time – that
the lower income fare better – for the full sample is driven in particular by
the extreme experiences of men in the top 20% and bottom 20% of the
income distribution. As discussed, the top 50% and bottom 50% of
females have near-identical retirement time. Yet, Table 5 reveals that this
similarity evaporates for the middle 60% of women. The upper-half of
middle income women have 8.8 years of retirement time, while the lowerhalf of middle income women have 7.7 years of retirement time. Note the
observations are small – involving eighty-five and forty-nine women,
respectively. Nevertheless, these observations are numerically important in
calculating average retirement times (insofar as they represent a sizeable
portion of the total retirement time sample). Therefore, these data for
women reinforce the conclusion that it is the top and bottom quintiles of
men, specifically, which account for the entirety of the negative relation
between income and retirement time.
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Next we consider the income class differences according to the
health status of respondents. 57 When the bottom and top quintiles are
included, lower-income individuals, regardless of health, garner more
retirement time than their higher-income counterparts (8.7 versus 8.1 for
poorer health individuals; 9.4 versus 8.6 for healthier individuals) even
though lower income individuals retire later – at ages 62.4 for the less
healthy and 62.7 for the healthier – than the higher income individuals, at
ages 61.5 and 61.7, respectively. Note that the retirement time benefit from
being healthy is larger for of the lower half of retirees (0.72 years) than
wealthier retirees (0.52 years). Overall we confirm, in Table 6, that health
status is a key driver of retirement time: healthier individuals, regardless of
income, enjoy more time in retirement than their unhealthy counterparts.
Table 6: Retirement Age and Time by Health Status and Income
Group in the Full Sample
Health

Good, Fair, Poor

Excellent, Very good

Income Class
No. Retired

Lower
Income
1,298

Upper
Income
1,021

Lower
Income
1,370

Upper
Income
1,868

Mean Retirement Age

62.42

61.51

62.68

61.76

Obs. Retirement Time

222

175

162

166

62.02

62.97

62.09

8.095

9.456

8.615

Mean Retirement Age
62.78
if Deceased
Mean Retirement Time 8.736

Excluding the extreme 20% at the top and bottom of the income
distribution, we see, in Table 7, that healthy and/or wealthy individuals
share approximately equal retirement times. Among the lower-income
middle class, healthier retirees have nearly a full year more of retirement
57

The cross tabulation of retirement time by income class and race does not
provide further insights beyond what has been discussed above: nonwhites have
more retirement time than whites, and in both cases, the relation is negatively
associated with income class for the full sample and positively associated with the
restricted, middle 60% sample. More importantly, we do not include these results
here because the cell counts for nonwhites becomes unjustifiably small in both
cases.
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time (8.7 years) than the less healthy lower-income middle class (7.8
years). However, the retirement time differential among the upper-income
middle class is insignificant at a mere 0.09 years (although this happens to
be in favor of the less healthy). Moreover, these retirement time figures for
the upper half of income earners are nearly equal to that of the healthy but
poor segment of the middle class. Thus, among the middle 60% of the
distribution, it is only the unhealthy, lower middle class that is at a
significant disadvantage in obtaining retirement time.
Table 7: Retirement Age and Time by Health Status and Income
Group Middle 60% of Distribution
Health

Good, Fair or Poor

Excellent/Very good

Income Class

Lower
Half

Upper
Half

Lower
Half

Upper
Half

No. Retired

754

704

849

1,104

Mean Retirement Age

62.47

61.66

62.82

61.62

Obs. Retirement Time

124

122

96

108

62.56

61.61

63.28

62.34

7.79

8.85

8.74

8.76

Mean Retirement Age
if Deceased
Mean Retirement
Time

Before moving to the regression analysis, we provide a brief
explanation of the observed biasness of our sample. If an individual
entered the HRS in the first survey wave in 1992, they would have been
followed for eighteen years (1992 through 2010). Many individuals have
simply not been a part of the survey long enough to have died. Those who
have died, and for whom we calculate a retirement time, are those from
groups with lower-than-average life expectancy.
Since it is well
documented that longevity is positively correlated with income, the people
who died are more likely to be lower income workers. Moreover, since
longevity is normally distributed, the HRS data captures a disproportionate
share of lower-income individuals’ left tail of their death age distribution,
relative to the death age distribution of higher income individuals. That is,
because the average death age of wealthier individuals is higher, we
observed a smaller segment of this distribution’s left tail.

2014

THE SURPRISING EQUALITY OF RETIREMENT TIME

423

This assessment is borne out in the data present in Tables 8 and 9.
The middle three quintiles have roughly equivalent rates of death (12.1%,
12.3% and 11.6%), whereas 14.13% of the bottom 20% of the income
distribution died compared to a mere 8.69% of the top 20%. Further, far
more men (15.2%), than women (8.14%) have died. The sex disparity, in
fact, is larger than the difference between the very healthy individuals who
died (8.9%) and the proportion of deceased people with worse health
(15.6%) as seen in Table 8. Each of the large differences – between
women and men, health status and the top and bottom 20% of the income
distribution – are associated with unexpected outcomes in the distribution
of retirement time. These rates of death support our focus on the middle
60% of the income distribution. Moreover, given the near-equal death rates
among the middle three quintiles, this middle class is likely more
representative of the true population. In other words, the middle class
subset is a reasonable representation of retirement times.
Table 8: Number and Proportion of Deceased Individuals, Plus Death
Age, Retirement Age and Time in the Full Sample
Proportion Deceased Individuals with a Retirement
Dead
Time Value

Gender
Health
Status
Income
Group

No.
Mean
Deceased Death
Age

Mean
Mean
Retirement Retirement
Age
Time

Women

8.14%

216

71.21

62.75

8.460

Men

15.22%

509

71.19

62.37

8.823

Good - Poor 15.63%
Excellent 8.94%
Very Good
Lower Half 12.89%

397

70.90

62.44

8.454

328

71.56

62.52

9.030

384

71.90

62.86

9.040

Upper Half

10.67%

341

70.40

62.05

8.348

Bottom 20%

14.13%

164

73.00

62.84

10.160

12.17%

145

71.58

63.22

8.367

12.35%

152

70.91

62.68

8.229

11.59%

153

70.30

61.36

8.934

8.69%

111

69.64

62.25

7.393

20-40%
Income
40-60%
Quintile
60-80%
Top 20%
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However, the final two rows of Table 9 show that the lower death
rate variation among the middle class does not hold across gender and
health categories. The proportion of deceased men (16.5%) is still far
greater than that of women (7.7%), as is the proportion of the deceased who
reported poorer health (16.0%) over those who reported being healthy
(9.1%). As a result, we are unable to entirely eliminate all biasness in
health and gender dimensions, even though we have eliminated the bias for
income groups. Therefore, in the regression analysis, we look at both the
full sample and the middle 60% subsample to provide some early insights
into the state of retirement in America.
Table 9: Number and Proportion of Deceased Individuals, Plus Death
Age, Retirement Age and Time in the Middle Class (Middle Three
Quintiles)

Women
Gender
Health
Status
Income
Group

Proportion Deceased Individuals with a
Dead
Time Value
No.
Mean
Mean
Deceased Death
Retirement
Age
Age

Retirement

7.66%

Men

16.52%
Good - Poor 16.00%
Excellent Very Good 9.08%
Lower
Half
12.07%
Upper Half 12.00%

Mean
Retirement
Time

134

70.65

62.52

8.129

316

71.03

62.36

8.676

246

70.41

62.09

8.314

204

71.53

62.78

8.753

220

71.08

62.87

8.203

230

70.77

61.96

8.809

D. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Using an ordinary least squares regression on the full sample, we
find higher income reduces retirement time, retirement age, and death age.
In fact, average full-time labor market income is the only significant
variable in each of the three regressions. Note income and retirement age
are negatively correlated: higher income people work longer. That higher
income individuals remain longer in the workforce explains much of the
anomalous results that higher income workers have less retirement time.
After controlling for income and health, men still have more
retirement time than women, but the difference is not statistically
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significant. Healthier individuals, after controlling for sex and income, die
1.36 years later and the result is highly significant (p-value 0). The age
of death, seen in the final column of Table 10, is negatively correlated with
income. Thus, as expected from the cross tabulations, the top 20% of this
sample tend to retire older and die a bit sooner.
Table 10: Retirement Time, Age and Death Age by Income, Gender
and Health Status
Full Sample

(1)

(2)

(3)

VARIABLES

Retirement
Time

Retirement
Age

Death Age

Average
Full-time
Labor Market Income
(Thousands of 2008 $)
Gender
(Male = 1;
Female = 0)
Health Status
(Excellent/ V. Good =
1;
Good to Poor = 0)
Constant

-0.0116**
(0.00471)

-0.00333**
(0.00157)

-0.0109**
(0.00488)

0.577
(0.468)

0.167
(0.154)

1.721***
(0.433)

0.604
(0.422)

0.168
(0.153)

1.358***
(0.403)

8.576***
(0.455)

62.07***
(0.151)

66.62***
(0.412)

Observations
R-squared

725
0.012

5,557
0.001

1,418
0.019

Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Working past age sixty-five is correlated with higher income and
earlier death in the full sample, but not for the middle class sample,
represented in Table 11. Labor market income is now associated with more
retirement time, which confirms the findings from the simple cross
tabulations. For the middle class, every $10,000 of labor market income
increases retirement time by 0.139 years (approximately 6 weeks).
Unfortunately, with the reduced sample size, from 725 observations in the
full sample in Table 10, to 450 in middle class sample in Table 11, the
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coefficient on retirement time is not statistically significant. Nevertheless,
the negative relationship between retirement age and labor market income
is significant in this sub-sample regression. Therefore, although this
second regression loses some of its explanatory power compared to the full
sample regression, it supports the hypothesis that, for now, the U.S.
retirement system enables lower income individuals to obtain retirement
time on an equal basis by enabling them to overcome their shorter life
expectancy through earlier retirement.
Table 11: Retirement Time, Age and Death Age by Income, Gender
and Health Status
Middle 60%
VARIABLES

(1)
Retirement
Time

(2)
Retirement
Age

(3)
Death Age

Average Full-time Labor
Market Income
(Thousands of 2008 $)
Gender
(Male = 1;
Female = 0)
Health Status
(Excellent/ V. Good = 1;
Good to Poor = 0)
Constant

0.0139
(0.0184)

-0.0464***
(0.00692)

-0.0344*
(0.0192)

0.497
(0.521)

0.522***
(0.180)

1.488***
(0.529)

0.441
(0.471)

0.197
(0.179)

1.519***
(0.491)

7.382***
(0.846)

63.70***
(0.312)

67.31***
(0.857)

Observations
R-squared

450
0.006

3,411
0.014

869
0.020

Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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IV.

INCOME INEQUALITY AMONG OLDER WORKERS IS
GETTING WORSE58

427

Finding that the U.S. retirement system equalizes retirement time is
in sharp contrast to the growing inequality of income over the past two
decades. Using the same data set, we find the income distribution for fulltime workers and their households has become more unequal. In 1992,
looking at Table 12, the mean full-time labor market income of middleincome earners (i.e., those in the third quintile – the 40th to 60th percentile)
was 31.7% of the average full-time labor market income of those in the top
quintile.59 By 2010, the middle quintile of workers’ average income was
only a quarter (25.3%) of the average income of the top 20%. The
disparities in median incomes also grew. In 1992, the middle-quintile’s
median income was 40.7% of that in the top quintile; by 2010, the median
middle-income individual had only one-third (33.3%) of the top 20%’s
median income.
Table 12: Ratio of Third Quintile (40-60%) to Fifth Quintile (80100%) of Full-time Labor Market Income
Year of HRS
Quintile’s Mean Income Quintile’s Median Income
Sample
1992
31.7%
40.7%
1994
31.5%
41.8%
1996
32.1%
40.8%
1998
28.2%
35.9%
2000
29.8%
37.3%
2002
27.9%
33.3%
2004
27.3%
34.7%
2006
26.4%
35.0%
2008
26.8%
34.5%
2010
25.3%
33.3%

58

See NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 57.
Note that these figures for the distribution of full-time income come from
the entire full-time workers sample in the HRS and thus are not subject to the
sample bias that exists when restricting the sample retirees or the deceased.
59
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RETIREMENT TIME EQUALITY AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR RETIREMENT AGE POLICIES

This study aimed to uncover retirement trends hidden by averages.
That the average American man is retiring earlier and living longer hides
the potential erosion in a major social accomplishment: Social Security,
Medicare, and pension programs allow rich, middle class, and low income
workers alike to retire before they die.
The lowest income groups in this sample are retiring early, while
others in the middle class are working longer and not enjoying as rapid
improvements in longevity. This means retirement time could grow more
unequal by social economic class if the age at which Social Security
beneficiaries collect full Social Security benefits is raised. It is a mistake to
assume that the facts that Americans are living longer and that Americans
are retiring earlier are not connected. Retirement improves health,
especially for men, so if people work longer, longevity improvements
could decrease and access to retirement time could decrease as well. 60
Reforming policies regarding one aspect of aging (e.g., retirement time)
because of changes in the average of another (e.g., death age) is, therefore,
ill advised.
It is well documented that the average American’s life expectancy
has increased markedly since World War II.61 The average American born
in 1950 lived to 68 years old. 62 By 1980, life expectancy at birth had
increased to 73.9 years and to then nearly 78 years by 2007. 63 These
remarkable increases hide a growing disparity of life expectancies among
different socio-economic groups. Longevity has not improved equally for
all Americans. Life expectancy for those in the top half of the income
distribution has improved much more than for those in the bottom half.64
Stunningly, this increasing inequality of outcomes has occurred with
remarkable speed. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank

60

See Kevin Neuman, Quit Your Job and Get Healthier? The Effect of
Retirement on Health, 29 J. LAB. RES., 177–201 (2008).
61
Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930-2010, NAT’L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, available at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html.
62
Id.
63
Arias, supra note 3, at 48.
64
See Cristia, supra note 3.
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estimates that from the 1983-1997 period to the 1998-2003 period,65 The
differences in life expectancy between the highest 20% and lowest earning
20% of Americans (for those ages 35-76) grew from 0.7 to 1.5 years among
women, and from 2.7 years to 3.6 years among men.66
To explain the growing disparities in longevity, other studies have
sought to isolate a broader range of socio-economic variables. Education is
a driving force behind longevity and mortality differentials.67 Waldron, an
economist, finds income is the driving force, though she did not have data
on education.68 Specifically, differentials in life expectancy among race-sex
groups (at age twenty-five) remained constant from 1990 to 2000, but that
differences significantly increase between high- and low-education
groups.69 Lower-educated women (both white and black) had a statistically
significant lower average life expectancy in 2000, compared to bettereducated women than they did in 1990.70
What are the implications for retirement policy? The evidence
suggests that raising the retirement age and implementing other policies
that encourage longer working lives may actually reverse longevity gains,
so that higher labor incomes may result in a decrease in retirement time.
Raising the normal retirement age in Social Security, which is equivalent to
cutting benefits for workers, will reduce income for any person in a group
that tends to leave the labor force early to compensate for a lower life
expectancy. Higher income people also obtain more years of life, but the
inequality of life expectancy can be counterbalanced by a well-designed
pension system that allows lower income and lower educated workers to
collect pensions or disability benefits earlier than higher income and higher
educated individuals. On the other hand, pension systems that encourage
lower-income, lower-educated people to work longer will create unequal
distributions of retirement time.
In sum, sex and health are important factors in predicting who will
have more or less retirement time, but economic class is a key factor. If
65

These periods were chosen so that the sizes of the two groups considered
were approximately equal.
66
Cristia, supra note 3, at 20, 29-30.
67
See Ellen R. Meara et al., The Gap gets Bigger: Changes in Mortality and
Life Expectancy, by Education, 1981-2000, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 350 (2008).
68
See Hilary Waldron, Trends in Mortality Differentials and Life Expectancy
for Male Social Security-Covered Workers by Socioeconomic Status, 67 SOC. SEC.
BULL., no. 3, 2007.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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lower socio-economic status individuals are forced to delay retirement
because private and/or public pension payments shrink, then retirement
time is bound to become more unequal.
Appendix A: Longevity at various ages, by race71
Table A: Longevity at Various Ages from 1980-2010, by Race
White Male

White Female

Black Male

Black Female

At birth

8.2%

4.1%

12.5%

7.6%

At 65 years

25.4%

10.3%

22.3%

14.9%

At 75 years

25.0%

11.3%

22.9%

16.8%

71

See ROBERT D. GROVE & ALICE M. HETZEL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC.,
& WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS RATES IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1960 (1968),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsus/vsrates1940_60.pdf; ELIZABETH
ARIAS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., UNITED STATES LIFE TABLES BY
HISPANIC ORIGIN (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/
sr_02/sr02_152.pdf; Sherry L. Murphy, et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN STATISTICS NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 2013, at
1, 3, 18-21, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchc/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf.
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Appendix B: Definition Variables
Variable
Name
Entry Age

Stata code

Explanation

Other Notes

Y_age

Age of respondent when
he/she first enters the HRS
survey.

Death Age

death_age

Difference between
year/month of death and
year/month of birth.
Month’s (1=January; 12 =
December) are divided by
12 and added/subtracted
from the difference in
years
Difference between
year/month of stated date
of retirement and
year/month of birth
Difference between
year/month of stated date
of when a disability
(keeping one from work)
began and year/month of
birth
Difference between
retirement or disabled age
and death age. If
respondent has both a
retirement and disability
age, retirement age is used.
Based on the respondents
labor force status (reported
in each survey), he/she is
considered retired only if
the first/primary response
is “retired”. Therefore a
respondent may be coded
as 1 for several survey
years – and may switch to
and from retirement.

Here ‘age’ is simply
the difference
between year of birth
and survey year
HRS 2010 Tracker
data.

Retirement
Age

ret_age

Disabled
Age

dis_age

Time
in ret_time
Retirement

Retired

retired{`year
’} or retired
(0 = not
retired;
1 = retired)

HRS records year of
death and then
verifies with CDC
mortality tables.
Year and month of
retirement is asked if
retired `year’ == 1
(see below)

Each respondent with
retired `year’ == 1
also states a year and
month of retirement.
For the calculations
of retirement time
and age we take the
mostly recently
reported retirement
year and month.
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Individual
Income

inc{`year’}

Average
Real
Income

avg_inc_r

Top Half /
Bottom
Half

avg_topbotto
m (0 =
bottom; 1 =
top)

Income
Quintile

avg_quint
(1 = poorest
20%;
5 = richest
20%)
GENDER
(0 = Woman;
1 = Man)
white
(0 = not
white;
1 = white)
inplan1992
(1 covered
by a plan; 0
= not
covered)
health1
(0 = not
great;
1= great)

Sex/Gender

White/NonWhite

Covered by
a Pension
Plan, 1992

Health
Status

Annual income from
wages, salaries and
business.
Positive values only.
Constructed by adjusting
individual incomes by CPI
to 2010 US dollars.
Average is constructed as
the mean for each
individuals across the
survey years they report an
individual income
Binary value assigned to
each respondent based on
whether their average real
income is above or below
of the median income
Same as Top / Bottom, but
dividing individuals into 5
income groups rather than
2.

Vol. 20.2

RAND income and
wealth files, 1992
through 2010. (e.g.,
r1iearn)
CPI adjustment
figures are taken
from IPUMS CPS
(CPI99)
The variable is
restricted to full-time
income only (35+
hr/wk; 40+ wk/yr)
The median average
income is the median

Cut off points are
based on average real
income

HRS 2010 Tracker
data
HRS 2010 Tracker
data

Whether employed persons
in 1992 are or are not
covered by a pension plan
at work that year.
Health status is a selfreported 5-level variable
with responses: ‘Poor’,
‘Fair’, ‘Good’, ‘Very
Good’ and ‘Excellent’.
The latter two are coded as
0, the former three are
coded as 1.

Health status is asked
in each survey year.
health1 takes the
first reported status

DESPERATE RETIREES: THE PERPLEXING CHALLENGE
OF COVERING RETIREMENT HEALTH CARE COSTS
IN A YOYO WORLD
RICHARD L. KAPLAN*
***
This article explores the challenges that retirees face when it comes to
selecting and paying for the proper healthcare coverage post retirement.
The author examines the rising cost of healthcare as well as the
complexities of Medicare plans that often make up a retiree’s healthcare
coverage package. The author concludes that most retirees are not
prepared to pay for healthcare in their retirement years.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

That retirement formulas and templates of earlier times have little
relevance to today’s retirees is a vast understatement. In virtually every
significant aspect of retirement planning, it is a brand new ball game, and
almost every change has spawned increasing uncertainty, unpredictability,
and anxiety for persons affected by these changes. To encapsulate the
direction of these massive changes, I have resorted to a four-letter acronym,
YOYO, which stands for You’re On Your Own.1 Quite bluntly, retirees and
prospective retirees are now the locus of increasing risks relating to
retirement security,2 and the foreseeable trends suggest that this situation
will only exacerbate in the future.

*

Peer and Sarah Pedersen Professor of Law, University of Illinois. This article
was prepared for the Symposium on “The Challenge of Retirement in a Defined
Contribution World” that was held at the University of Connecticut School of Law
on April 5, 2013.
1
To be sure, there is a whole sub-industry of advice-providers seeking to
assist individuals with the financial aspects of retirement. See, e.g., WALL ST. J.,
May 13, 2013, at C7 (full-page advertisement showcasing twenty-five “best selling
authors” on this topic from a single publisher).
2
See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security
Privatization, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2004). See generally EDWARD A. ZELINSKY,
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Rather than try to consider all of these changes, I will explore
instead just one very important, but largely neglected, component of the
increasingly desperate condition in which today’s retirees find themselves –
namely, covering the cost of health care during their retirement. The
significance of this issue is captured by the most recent Health Confidence
Survey that was reported this past January.3 An analysis of that Survey by
the Employee Benefit Research Institute concluded that “[t]he percentage
of Americans reporting that health expenses are an important consideration
when planning for retirement has always been relatively high, and it has
recently increased.”4 The survey results for the most recent three years are
summarized in the following table:5
Percent of Respondents Citing Medical Expenses as
Extremely or Very Important in Planning for Retirement
2010

2011

2012

Extremely Important

38

37

45

Very Important

31

33

26

Total

69

70

71

Paying for one’s health care is, of course, a major issue throughout
a person’s life, but many people were able to ignore the fundamental
necessity of securing health insurance until they retire, because their
employers typically provided health insurance as part of their compensation
package.6 While the specific components of such coverage undoubtedly
THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA (2007).
3
Paul Fronstin, Views on Health Coverage and Retirement: Findings from the
2012 Health Confidence Survey, EMP. BENEFITS RES. INST. NOTES, Jan. 2013 at 2,
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_01_Jan-13_HCS-TxEx
ps3.pdf.
4
Id.
5
See id. at 5, fig.3.
6
See Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health
Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 535, 537–40 (2005).
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changed over the years, the essential availability and general contours of
such coverage were generally not a major concern. Employers negotiated
with health care providers or insurers, designing one or more packages of
benefits that they thought their employees might want, handled much of the
attendant paperwork in administering the plan, and facilitated enrollment
via their payroll systems.7 Such employer involvement, if not beneficence,
basically disappears once a person retires. As a result, the financial context
of health care coverage that retirees confront is fundamentally different
than what they had when they were working.
The nature of this contrast can be described in overview as follows:
wage earners received periodic income, increased irregularly for reasons of
inflation or career advancement, with income taxes withheld from each
payment,8 along with health insurance for themselves and their dependents.
Classic pension schemes based on defined benefit plans9 self-consciously
sought to mimic this basic pattern, though usually without any scheduled
increases in payment amounts. That is, traditional pensions and retirement
annuities provide periodic income, with income taxes withheld from each
payment,10 but no increases for inflation once they commence. But the
bigger difference is that most retirees cannot look to their former employer
for coverage of their health care expenses. As I have noted elsewhere,11
retiree health benefits are provided by fewer employers every year, and the
benefits that are provided are diminished regularly. Accordingly,
employees who had been largely sheltered from the chore of securing
coverage for unexpected health care costs must become their own human
resources counselors upon retirement. They must learn how to navigate a
very different health care system, one that was assembled over several
decades with no coherent vision and with precious little regard to consumer
friendliness.
Fidelity Investments, the major financial services provider, has
estimated that a retired couple aged sixty-five years is likely to need nearly
7

See id. at 540–41; see also David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for
Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23
(2001).
8
I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2007–2011).
9
See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 361–64 (5th ed. 2010).
10
I.R.C. § 3405(a)(1) (Supp. V 2007–2012).
11
See generally Richard L. Kaplan et al., Retirees at Risk: The Precarious
Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 287 (2009).
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a quarter of a million dollars to pay for their health care costs in
retirement.12 This estimate is necessarily an average figure, and many
retirees will need substantially more funds for this essential retirement
outlay. Much depends upon how long a specific individual lives, that
person’s health status, the nature and extent of health care that that person
receives, and the rate of health care cost inflation, among other factors. A
careful simulation by the Employee Benefit Research Institute determined
that a sixty-five year old man would need savings of $135,000 to
$185,000,13 depending on the extent of his prescription drug usage, and a
sixty-five year old female would require $154,000 to $210,000.14 These
projections cover anticipated Medicare premiums, deductibles, and copayment or cost-sharing obligations as well as the cost of certain
supplementary arrangements. They do not, however, include the cost of
long-term care.15 But the basic point is that retirees face a large and
unpredictable liability in retirement for their health care expenses. That
such a prospect is foisted on retirees in a “You’re On Your Own” world
makes retirement security – the theme of this Symposium – especially
problematic.
II.

MEDICARE ELIGIBILITY

Many workers, and much of the public as well, have the mistaken
impression that upon retirement, their health care cost concerns are over
because they can now access the federal government’s Medicare program.
But Medicare is no walk in the park in terms of understandability or
internal consistency, and it is not generally available to retirees who have
not yet reached the statutory eligibility age of sixty-five years.16 This is a
very important point because many Americans retire before that age, not
always as a matter of choice. In fact, most retirees begin collecting Social
12

FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC, THE INCREASING COST OF HEALTH
CARE
UPON
RETIREMENT
(2012),
available
at
http://workplace.fidelity.com/sites/default /files/FF_TBO_IncreasingCostofHC.pdf
(projecting required savings at $240,000).
13
Paul Fronstin et al., Savings Needed for Health Expenses for People Eligible
for Medicare: Some Rare Good News, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES, Oct. 2012,
at 2, 4, available at http://www.ebri.org/ pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_10_Oct-12.
HlthSvg-IRAs.pdf.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 5.
16
42 U.S.C. § 1395c(1) (2006).
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Security retirement benefits before reaching age sixty-five, and a majority
do so as early as age sixty-two.17 These “early” retirees cannot, however,
access Medicare before age sixty-five unless they satisfy the Social
Security program’s functionality-based criteria for being “disabled”
namely, that they are unable to perform “any substantial gainful activity by
reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.”18
Moreover, they must have received disability payments under this standard
for twenty-four months before they become eligible for Medicare
coverage.19 If they cannot qualify under these requirements, they must wait
until their sixty-fifth birthday to enroll in Medicare and therefore must
secure health insurance from some other source before then.20
Proposals were made near the end of the Clinton Administration to
allow retirees who were not yet sixty-five years old to buy into Medicare at
actuarially fair prices, but those proposals were soon eclipsed by the
Monica Lewinsky scandal and the ensuing presidential impeachment
battle.21 The last time this issue was seriously considered was in the context
of the major health care reform legislation enacted during President
Obama’s first term,22 known variously as the Affordable Care Act or
ObamaCare.23 That legislation actually jettisoned the prospect of earlyaccess Medicare in favor of universally available health insurance
exchanges that are scheduled to begin next year.24 Although the new law
did include a very modest program to subsidize employers that maintained

17

See Dan Muldoon & Richard W. Kopcke, Are People Claiming Social
Security Benefits Later?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES., JUNE 2008 at 1, 2, available
at http:// crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/ib_8-7.pdf.
18
42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2007–2011).
19
Id. §§ 426(b)(2)(A)(i), 1395c(2).
20
See Kaplan et al., supra note 11, at 336–37 (explaining the possible
availability of “continuation” coverage from a former employer under certain
specified circumstances).
21
See id. at 343.
22
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
23
See Richard L. Kaplan, Analyzing the Impact of the New Health Care
Reform Legislation on Older Americans, 18 ELDER L.J. 213, 213–14 (2011).
24
See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (enacted as part of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1311(b), 124
Stat. 119, 173 (2010)).
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their existing health insurance programs for pre-Medicare retirees,25 that
program disappears entirely in 201426 when the state-organized health
insurance exchanges will presumably be operational.27
In any case, if Medicare’s eligibility age is reconsidered amidst the
current efforts to tackle America’s long-term fiscal dilemma, it is more
likely that this age will be raised then lowered. Indeed, coordinating
Medicare’s eligibility age with Social Security’s age for full retirement
benefits has been seriously considered for some time.28 That change would
boost Medicare’s eligibility age to sixty-six currently and eventually to
sixty-seven.29 For what it’s worth, if Medicare’s eligibility age of sixtyfive were adjusted for changes in life expectancy that have occurred since
the program was enacted, it would be seventy-three years.30 The bottom
line is that retirees who are not yet sixty-five years old cannot enroll in
Medicare, presently or in the foreseeable future.
III.

MEDICARE’S COVERAGE COMPONENTS

Retirees who can enroll in Medicare confront an uncoordinated
“system” of separate coverages and confusing options that does not
correspond even remotely to what they had during their working lives. The
elemental separation of Medicare’s disparate coverages into hospital costs
(Part A), physicians’ charges (Part B), and prescription drug expenses (Part
D) is unfathomable to new retirees who are accustomed to the all-inclusive
25

Under this program, the federal government paid eighty percent of claims
for medical services costing between $15,000 and $90,000 that were incurred
between June 22, 2010 and December 31, 2013. 42 U.S.C. § 18002(c)(2), (3)
(Supp. IV 2007-2011) (enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1102(c)(2), (3), 124 Stat. 119, 145 (2010)). The
maximum benefit per claim, in other words, was $60,000 (maximum claim of
$75,000 × 80%). Among other limitations, this program had a global budget cap of
$5 billion, after which no further claims were payable. 42 U.S.C. § 18002(e).
26
42 U.S.C. § 18002(a)(1).
27
42 U.S.C. § 18031(b).
28
See Richard L. Kaplan, Taking Medicare Seriously, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV.
777, 791–92.
29
See 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1) (2006).
30
Life expectancy when Medicare was created (1965) was 70.2 years and was
78.7 years in 2010. Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930–2010, INFO.
PLEASE (2011), http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html. Therefore, 78.7 ÷
70.2 = 1.12108 × 65 = 72.9 years.
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health care plans that characterize the modern workplace. To be fair, when
Medicare was created in 1965, its designers self-consciously mimicked the
“major medical” plans that private health insurance companies were then
offering.31 But those plans evolved over time, while Medicare’s
fundamental organizational components have not. As a result, a newly
retired person faces a program that seems designed for a time long ago and
in fact was.
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of this programmatic
ossification involves prescription drugs. When Medicare was created in
1965, such medications were few and relatively inexpensive and were used
primarily to treat specific maladies over very short time courses. In the
ensuing decades, however, pharmacological innovations have brought forth
a veritable cornucopia of amazing treatments that control and ameliorate a
wide range of common chronic conditions including heart disease,
hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, asthma, osteoporosis, and the like. These
drug regimens are not cheap and generally must be followed for the rest of
a patient’s life, but they extend people’s lives and improve the quality of
the lives they live. Yet, by the time that Medicare was changed to cover
outpatient prescription drugs, it was the only health care insurance program
in the country that lacked such coverage – a situation that typifies the
anachronistic nature of Medicare’s basic structure.
IV.

MEDICARE’S COST EXPOSURES

Unbeknownst to most pre-retirees, Medicare is not a
comprehensive health care plan.32 It exposes its beneficiaries to a dizzying
array of deductibles and co-payments that can be understood only as
historical accidents lacking any sense of medical coherence.
A. HOSPITALS
Medicare Part A covers most of a retiree’s hospital costs for up to
sixty days in a single “spell of illness” after payment of a per-admission
deductible.33 A “spell of illness” for this purpose begins with the admission
31

See THE CENTURY FOUND., MEDICARE TOMORROW: THE REPORT OF THE
CENTURY FOUNDATION TASK FORCE ON MEDICARE REFORM 47 (2001).
32
See Richard L. Kaplan, Top Ten Myths of Medicare, 20 ELDER L.J. 1, 10–11
(2012).
33
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(b) (2006).
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and ends sixty days after the patient has been discharged.34 Although a peradmission deductible is a fairly common feature in health care plans, it
usually is much lower; e.g., $250. That is not the case with Medicare. The
per-admission deductible in 2014 is $1,216,35 and it increases every year
based on increases in health care costs generally. Moreover, retirees tend
to use more health care services than the general population and could
conceivably face two or even three hospitalizations in the same calendar
year.
For example, a retiree might be hospitalized on January 14,
discharged two weeks later, and then readmitted in May and perhaps in
October as well. If that happened, this retiree would be liable for the peradmission deductible twice or even three times that year. In this context, it
is extremely important to note that Medicare has no annual stop-loss
provisions that cap an enrollee’s out-of-pocket costs once that person’s
expenditures reach some pre-determined amount36 – again unlike many, if
not most, health care plans that are available today to the pre-Medicare
population.
Medicare Part A also has a durational limitation on hospital stays
that reflects its generally out-of-date orientation. Medicare covers virtually
all costs for up to sixty days and then covers costs in excess of a daily
deductible for an additional thirty days within the same “spell of illness.”37
That per-day deductible is adjusted annually and in 2014 is $304.38 The
resulting cost exposure, however, is fairly inconsequential because a
hospital stay exceeding sixty days is very uncommon, especially after the
Diagnostic Range Groupings were implemented in 1987.39 These groupings
limit how many hospital days Medicare will pay for specific treatments and
as a result, the average hospital stay of a person age sixty-five and older is
less than six days, according to the most recent data available.40
34

42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a) (2006).
Medicare
2014
Costs
at
a
Glance,
MEDICARE.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/costs-at-a-glance/costs-atglance.html#collapse-4811 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
36
Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, The Insurance Value of Medicare, 367
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1773, 1773 (2012).
37
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a) (2006).
38
Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, supra note 35.
39
See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?, 162–64 (1997).
40
See ADMIN. ON AGING, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A
PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS: 2012 13 (2013), available at
35
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B. NURSING HOMES
Medicare Part A’s coverage of nursing home care is far more
restrictive than its coverage of hospital charges but is similarly timewarped. Nursing home costs are covered by Medicare for the first twenty
days within a “spell of illness,”41 and Medicare then pays all costs beyond a
per-day deductible,42 which in 2014 is $152.43 This extended coverage,
however, cannot exceed eighty days,44 so Medicare’s coverage stops after
one hundred days in a nursing home. This coverage design may have been
appropriate when Medicare was created in 1965, when most people did not
live long enough to develop conditions like Alzheimer’s Disease, which
can require care in a nursing facility for three to five years or longer. But
today, the majority of older residents in nursing homes have such
conditions, and a result, Medicare’s one-hundred-day coverage limitation
seems archaic, if not downright cruel.
Moreover, even this limited coverage of nursing home costs is
subject to a major and poorly understood overarching restriction – namely,
that the patient requires and receives “skilled nursing care” on a daily
basis45 for the same or a medically related condition that was treated
previously in a hospital.46 Most retirees and their families do not realize
that much of the care these facilities provide is actually lower-level
“custodial care” rather than “skilled nursing care,” which typically entails
injections, gastronomy feedings, catheters, administration of medical gases,
and the like.47 Consequently, Medicare does not cover the cost of such care.
Moreover, the prior hospitalization must have lasted at least three
days48 and must have occurred within the thirty days preceding admission
http://www.aoa.gov/aoaroot/aging_statistics/Profile/2012/docs/2012profile.pdf
(reporting that persons aged sixty-five to seventy-four averaged stays of 5.4 days,
persons aged seventy-five to eighty-four averaged 5.7 days, and persons aged
eighty-five and over averaged 5.6 days).
41
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395d(a)(2)(A), 1395e(a)(3) (Supp. III 2007–2010).
42
Id. § 1395e(a)(3).
43
Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, supra note 35.
44
42 U.S.C. § 1395e(a)(3).
45
42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 2007-2010); 42 C.F.R. § 409.31(b)(1)
(2012).
46
42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 409.31(b)(2)(ii).
47
42 C.F.R. § 409.33(a)-(c) (2012).
48
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(i) (2006).
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to the nursing home.49 So, if a retiree enters a nursing home directly from
her home, for example, Medicare does not cover any of the ensuing
expenses.
Adding insult to injury, the Diagnostic Range Groupings that
reduced the number of days that Medicare would pay for hospital care
effectively eliminated Medicare’s coverage of many nursing home stays.
That is, when a hospital stay for a particular medical condition is shortened
from three days to two days, a subsequent nursing home stay will not be
covered by Medicare because of that program’s three-day minimum.50 The
bottom line is that Medicare’s coverage of nursing home care is much more
limited than it first appears, which means that retirees who require such
facilities face considerable financial exposure for the cost of care they
receive there. In this context, it should be noted that Medicare provides no
coverage whatsoever for care in assisted living facilities, largely because
those institutions did not exist when Medicare was created.
C. DOCTORS’ FEES
Physicians’ charges are another source of major expense for
retirees and are covered by Medicare Part B. Medicare pays eighty percent
of a participating physician’s “approved charge,”51 and the patient then
owes the remaining twenty percent. Nonparticipating physicians can
charge patients up to an additional fifteen percent of the “approved
charge,”52 and increasing numbers of health care providers are switching
from participating to nonparticipating provider status53 in response to
repeated reductions in Medicare’s “approved charge” schedules – the most
recent being the two percent reduction mandated by the Budget Control
49

Id. § 1395x(i)(A).
Exacerbating this problem is the practice of many hospitals to keep patients
for several days in “observation” status. See Christopher W. Baugh & Jeremiah D.
Schur, Observation Care-High-Value Care or a Cost-Shifting Loophole?, 369 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 302, 303 (2013). Such patients are not treated as being admitted into
the hospital, so the days they spend in “observation” do not count toward the threeday minimum. See id.
51
42 U.S.C. § 1395l(a)(1) (2006).
52
Id. § 1395w-4(g)(2)(C).
53
See Melinda Beck, More Doctors Steer Clear of Medicare, WALL ST. J.,
July 29, 2013, at A1, A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424127887323971204578626151017241898 (reporting a 2.9% increase in
nonparticipating providers from 2010 to 2012).
50
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Act’s sequestration provisions.54 In effect, such payment reductions can
indirectly increase retirees’ health care costs as more physicians change
their status to nonparticipating provider, a phenomenon that is likely to
increase as federal budgetary pressures worsen.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that doctors’ bills are not
occasional expenditures for most Medicare beneficiaries. Fully forty
percent of Medicare’s population has three or more so-called “chronic
conditions,” such as heart disease, asthma, osteoporosis, hypertension,
arthritis, diabetes, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.55 These
conditions typically require regular appointments with various medical
specialists to control the patient’s health and to forestall expensive
complications and hospitalizations. Doctors’ visits, in other words, are far
more frequent and less episodic for retirees than for pre-retirees as a
general matter.
V.

MEDICARE PART B OPTIONS

As noted previously in passing, the coverage for physicians’
charges just described is provided under Medicare Part B rather than Part
A, a distinction that has significant financial implications for retirees.
Medicare Part A is financed by a payroll tax of 1.45 percent imposed on an
employee’s wages and salaries,56 with a comparable amount paid by that
person’s employer.57 After that worker (or the worker’s spouse)58 has
earned forty “quarters of coverage,”59 Medicare Part A is provided without
any further premiums being charged.60 In contrast, Medicare Part B is a
54

2 U.S.C. § 901a(8) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (enacted as part of the Budget
Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–25, § 302(a), 125 Stat. 240, 258 (2011)).
55
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE AT A GLANCE 1 fig. 1 (2012), available
at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-15.pdf.
56
I.R.C. § 3101(b)(6) (Supp. V 2007–2012).
57
Id. § 3111(b)(6).
58
42 C.F.R. § 406.10(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1), (c)(1) (2006). The
divorced spouse of a Medicare-eligible worker is also entitled to Medicare Part A
if the divorced spouse is at least sixty-five years old and if this person was married
to the Medicare-eligible worker for at least ten years. 42 C.F.R. § 406.10(a)(1)
(2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1), (c)(1), 416(d)(1) (2006).
59
42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2006).
60
Persons who have not earned the requisite forty “quarters of coverage” may
purchase Medicare Part A if they have lawfully lived in the United States at least
five years. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-2(a)(3) (2006). The monthly premium for such
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separate program that requires annual enrollment and monthly premiums
paid by the retirees themselves.61 In 2014, this monthly premium is
$104.90,62 which is calculated to cover approximately twenty-five percent
of the program’s projected expenditures.63 This monthly outlay, in other
words, represents a seventy-five percent subsidy from general tax revenues.
Since 2006, higher-income enrollees have been required to pay
surcharges to reduce the extent of the subsidy that they receive.64 The
amount of these so-called “means-tested” surcharges is based on an
enrollee’s taxable income as determined for the second-preceding calendar
year.65 Thus, the following table66 displays the monthly cost of Medicare
Part B in 2014 as a function of a retiree’s income for federal income tax
purposes in 2011:
Income (if unmarried)

Monthly Payment

$85,000 or less

$104.90

$85,001 - $107,000

$146.90

$107,001 - $160,000

$209.80

$160,001 - $214,000

$272.70

Over $214,000

$335.70

coverage is adjusted annually and in 2013 was $441. Medicare 2014 Costs at a
Glance, supra note 35.
61
42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2006). See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at
76–83.
62
Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, supra note 35.
63
42 U.S.C.§ 1395r(a)(1), (3) (Supp. V 2007–2012); see MEDICARE
HANDBOOK § 6.02[C][1], at 6–11 (Judith A. Stein & Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr. eds.,
2013).
64
42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i)(1), (4)(B)(i) (2006).
65
See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Means-Testing Medicare: Retiree Pain for
Little Governmental Gain, J. RETIREMENT PLANNING, May-June 2006, at 22.
66
See Part B Costs, MEDICARE.GOV, http://medicare.gov/your-medicarecosts/part -b-costs/part-b-costs.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2014).
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Note that the applicable income thresholds are doubled for married
couples.67 Moreover, these thresholds were frozen through the year 2019,
rather than being adjusted for inflation, by the Affordable Care Act.68
Accordingly, increasing numbers of retirees are likely to face income-based
surcharges for Medicare Part B in the future.
The principal point, however, is that Medicare Part B is optional
coverage. Thus, retirees must decide as an initial matter whether they want
such coverage at all. Retirees who do not anticipate having many physician
encounters might forego such coverage, but they will then be subject to a
delayed enrollment penalty if they subsequently enroll in this program.69
This penalty is ten percent of the regular Medicare Part B monthly
premium for every twelve-month period in which the retiree did not enroll
in the program when she was first eligible.70
Assume, for example, that Denise delayed enrolling in Medicare
Part B for forty months, so there are three twelve-month periods within that
delayed enrollment period. She will therefore owe a penalty of thirty
percent (ten percent for each twelve-month delayed enrollment period) of
the monthly Medicare Part B premium. Most importantly, this penalty
provision never ceases! That is, Denise will owe thirty percent more for her
Medicare Part B benefits as long as she is enrolled in Medicare Part B.
VI.

“MEDIGAP” COVERAGE

As noted previously, the various deductibles and co-payment
obligations in Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B represent an openended liability. That is, there is no annual cap on the amount of such costs.
For that reason, many Medicare beneficiaries decide to supplement their
Medicare coverage with private insurance that is usually called “Medigap”
insurance.71 Some retirees are able to purchase such supplemental coverage
from their former employer or from their union, while others obtain such

67

42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i)(3)(C)(ii), (iii) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i)(6) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (enacted as part of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 3402(4), 124 Stat.
119, 489 (2010)).
69
42 U.S.C. § 1395r(b) (Supp. V 2007-2012).
70
Id.
71
See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 97–103.
68
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coverage individually.72 In any case, the question of supplemental
insurance presents retirees with further choices, each of which has financial
implications.
First, retirees must decide whether to purchase Medigap insurance
at all. Such policies are not inexpensive and their cost is usually borne by
the retirees. The federal government does not provide any financial
subsidies for Medigap insurance, although it does regulate its content73 and
mandates that retirees cannot be denied Medigap insurance because of preexisting medical conditions if they purchase this insurance within the first
six months of their enrolling in Medicare Part B.74
Second, retirees must then select among the eleven different but
standardized Medigap insurance packages that include various benefits.75
Medigap insurers can determine what they will charge for particular
policies, but the scope of any specific “plan” does not vary from one
insurer to another. Thus, a retiree must first determine which combination
of specific benefits most closely fits his or her needs and then look for the
best price from the insurers that offer that plan. For example, a prospective
retiree may choose Medigap coverage for the per-hospital-admission
deductible under Part A or decide instead to self-insure for that liability by
not obtaining such coverage. Similarly, a retiree who expects to travel
outside the United States might want to add the “foreign travel emergency”
benefit. In general, the more extensive the coverages included, the higher
the plan’s cost. But the point is that Medigap itself presents a series of
distinct choices that a retiree must consider.
To summarize, a retiree must decide first whether to enroll in
Medicare Part B presently, whether to enroll at some later time and pay the
corresponding delayed enrollment penalty, or whether to forego Medicare
Part B entirely. This retiree must then decide whether to buy a Medigap
policy to cover the unlimited cost exposure of Medicare Parts A and B
presently or to wait until some later time and lose the guaranteed
72

See JULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE
CHARTBOOK 60 (4th ed. 2010), available at http://www.collaborationhealthcare.
com/11-9-10KFFMedicareChartBook2010.pdf (stating that ninety percent of
Medicare beneficiaries have some supplemental health insurance).
73
42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(o), (p), (w), (y) (2006 & Supp. IV 2007–2011).
74
Id. § 1395ss(s)(2)(A) (2006).
75
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE & YOU 67–72 (2014), available at
http://www.medicare. gov/ Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf.
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insurability that is available within the first six months of Medicare Part B
enrollment. Finally, the retiree must decide which specific Medigap policy
to buy.
VII.

PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE OPTIONS

The level of complexity and cost exposure described above
actually pales in comparison to what is involved regarding Medicare’s
coverage of prescription drugs. Once again, the threshold decision is
whether to buy prescription drug coverage at all, or whether to pay for
prescribed drugs as the need for them arises. While the private companies
that provide Medicare Part D coverage cannot deny coverage because of a
retiree’s pre-existing medical conditions, there is a delayed enrollment
penalty in Part D that is structured similarly to the delayed enrollment
penalty in Medicare Part B that was considered previously.76 To some
extent, the decision to forego Medicare Part D coverage presently is a bet
that one will not need such coverage any time soon – even though new
medications are being developed every year to treat existing maladies and
one never knows whether he or she might be diagnosed with such
conditions in the future.
If a retiree does decide to obtain prescription drug coverage under
Medicare Part D, the next step is determining which plan to buy. This is no
easy decision, because there is no single Medicare Part D plan or even
standardized Medicare Part D plans comparable to the federally
standardized Medigap plans described above.77 Instead, private insurers
offer different plans in different states that cover some medications and not
others, and some dosage amounts and frequencies but not others. Thus, a
given plan might cover 20 milligrams of Lipitor® twice a day, another plan
will cover 40 milligrams of that drug once a day, and still another plan will
not cover Lipitor® at all. In essence, a retiree must gather the various
medications that he or she is taking currently and then enter their names,
dosage amounts, and dosage frequencies into Medicare’s website to find
the available plans that cover these medications.78 Additional
76

42 U.S.C. § 1395w-113(b)(1) (2006). For the mechanics of how this penalty
is calculated, see FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 88.
77
See supra text accompanying note 75.
78
See Medicare Plan Finder, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/
find-a-plan/ questions/home.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). (follow “General
Search” hyperlink (entering zip code); enter basic information on next page (step 1
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differentiating variables among the offered plans might include
convenience of pharmacy locations and availability of mail order renewals.
Most Medicare Part D plans impose an annual deductible that is
fairly modest. In 2013, for example, fifty-five percent of Medicare Part D
plans had an annual deductible, usually $325.79 Such plans typically
provide several distinct “tiers” of cost coverage. That is, a plan might
require a low or no co-payment for certain generic medications while
charging a higher co-payment for a preferred brand-name drug and an even
higher co-payment for a nonpreferred brand-name drug. Most plans also
have a coverage gap that is generally denominated the “donut hole” in
which annual drug expenditures above a specified amount are covered to a
lesser extent.80 In 2013, two out of three Medicare Part D plans had
coverage gaps that began at $2,970 in annual drug costs.81 The Affordable
Care Act purports to close this “donut hole,” but the closing process phases
in over ten years and will still leave enrollees with a co-payment obligation
of twenty-five percent when it is complete.82 Thus, retirees in 2014 are
responsible for seventy-two percent of the cost of generic drugs and fortyseven and a half percent of the cost of brand-name drugs for costs incurred
within the “donut hole.”83
In any case, the procedure for finding a Medicare Part D
prescription drug plan must be repeated every year, because plan providers
regularly change their formularies in advance of the annual enrollment
process. Thus, a Humana plan that reasonably met a retiree’s needs one
year may not meet those needs the next year, may be much more
expensive, or may not even be offered. I am not making this up!

of 4), then see step 2 of 4 “Enter your Drugs” (plan selection and estimate can be
generated by completing questionnaire)).
79
JACK HOADLEY ET AL., MEDICARE PART D: A FIRST LOOK AT PART D PLAN
OFFERINGS IN 2013 3 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.word
press.com/2013/01/8375.pdf.
80
For an explanation of how this curious provision came about, see Richard L.
Kaplan, The Medicare Drug Benefit: A Prescription for Confusion, 1 NAELA J.
167, 170–74 (2005).
81
See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 79, at 3.
82
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(b)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (generic drugs);
id. § 1395w-102(b)(2)(D)(i)(I), (ii)(VI) (brand-name drugs). For a graphic
representation of the phase-in process, see Kaplan, supra note 23, at 219–220.
83
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 75, at 91.
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As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, retirees seeking to
pay for their health care expenses in retirement confront a bewildering if
not overwhelming array of disjointed coverages under Medicare, each with
its own programmatic limitations and cost-sharing provisions. There is an
alternative approach, however, in the form of Medicare’s managed care
component, which is legally designated as Medicare Part C, but is more
popularly styled Medicare Advantage.84 For a single monthly premium and
nominal co-payment obligations, one organization provides the sort of allinclusive health insurance arrangement that many retirees had when they
were still working. Such arrangements typically limit an enrollee’s access
to specific hospitals, doctors, pharmacies, and other health care providers,
while services obtained from “out-of network” providers are covered at
substantially higher cost to the enrollee, or not at all.85 While such
restrictions are endemic to managed care plans generally, the prospect of
losing access to favored specialists is often very troubling to retirees who
have established relationships with particular health care providers. In fact,
only twenty-eight percent of Medicare’s population was enrolled in a
Medicare Advantage plan in 2013.86
If a retiree is comfortable with the basic concept of managed care,
that person must then select from among the Medicare Advantage plans
that are available in that person’s geographic area. This decision,
moreover, will probably need to be revisited annually, because Medicare
Advantage plans regularly change the array of health care providers that
they include, adding some and dropping others, as well as the scope of
benefits they provide and the monthly cost they charge to enrollees. This
process is generally undertaken during the annual “re-enrollment period”
that runs from October 15 to December 7,87 but certain changes can be
made at other times as well, such as when an enrollee moves out of the
geographic area that his or her current Medicare Advantage plan covers.88

84

42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (2006).
See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 104–06 (describing
Medicare’s managed care component).
86
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE FACT SHEET 1 (2013),
available at http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-fact-sheet/.
87
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(e)(3)(B)(v) (Supp. V 2007–2012).
88
Id. § 1395w-21(e)(4)(B) (2006).
85
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Near term, such plans may become less available or less appealing
due to the Affordable Care Act. The drafters of that legislation believed
that Medicare managed care plans were overpaid by the federal
government, so payments to these plans are to be reduced beginning in
2014.89 In fact, more than a quarter of the cost savings in Medicare from
ObamaCare come from cuts in payments to Medicare Advantage plans.90
These plans, therefore, are likely to curtail some of the nonmandatory
benefits that they provide currently, such as vision care and hearing aids,
and some plans may terminate their participation in Medicare entirely.
Little wonder, therefore, that Medicare’s Chief Actuary when the
Affordable Care Act was being considered predicted that enrollment in
Medicare Advantage would drop by half when the projected cuts are “fully
phased in.”91 As even more retirees opt for the disjointed Medicare
components examined previously instead of Medicare managed care, this
population will likely face greater health care cost exposure and fiscal
uncertainty.
IX.

THE PREMIUM SUPPORT ALTERNATIVE?

The relatively recent and highly controversial enactment of health
care reform in 2010 suggests that any serious effort to rethink how health
care for older Americans should be financed is unlikely any time soon. In
fact, ObamaCare is a staggering testament to the power of path
dependency. Despite all the heated rhetoric that accompanied its gestation
and the impassioned allegations of a government “takeover” of the health
care system, rampant socialism, and even death panels, the Affordable Care
Act left the basic structure of the Medicare program intact. The
noncoordinated components of Medicare Parts A, B, and D, though largely
accidents of history, were not reformed or rationalized in any meaningful
89

See Kaplan, supra note 23, at 239–40.
See Memorandum of Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act,” as Amended 2, 8 (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/health/oactmemo1.pdf; see also Letter from
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office to John Boehner, Speaker
of the House 5 (July 24, 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/43471-hr6079.pdf (showing that twenty-one percent of the
projected Medicare savings in the Affordable Care Act derive from cuts to the
Medicare Advantage program).
91
Memorandum of Richard S. Foster, supra note 90, at 11.
90
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way. In fact, the only paradigmatic alternative to this basic structure –
namely, Medicare managed care – was actually the focus of significant
budget cuts.
In 2011, the chair of the House Budget Committee, Congressman
Paul Ryan, proposed transforming the Medicare program into a
marketplace where beneficiaries could select from various comprehensive
offerings, with the federal government providing premium support or
“vouchers” for these offerings.92 Instead of the present one-size-fits-all
approach, the retirement health care universe would look more like what
Americans under age sixty-five typically have. Congressman Ryan’s plan
included very few details, but the basic vision it propounded would look
fairly familiar to persons who have never enrolled in Medicare. Be that as it
may, the 2012 elections effectively sidelined that effort for the foreseeable
future, and President Obama’s full-throated defense of entitlement
programs such as Medicare in his Second Inaugural Address93 makes major
systemic change unlikely.
From the perspective of current and near-retirees, however, the
Ryan proposal would have been irrelevant by its very terms. His original
proposal would have applied only to persons who first became eligible for
Medicare in the year 2022.94 That provision essentially exempts the current
Medicare population, as well as a significant portion of the vaunted Baby
Boom generation that is gaining access to Medicare with each passing day.
Even more to the point, Ryan subsequently adopted a feature suggested by
Senator Ron Wyden that would retain the existing Medicare program as
one of the alternatives in the marketplace that he intends to create.95 In
92

See H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 112TH CONG., THE PATH TO PROSPERITY
RESTORING AMERICA’S PROMISE 46–47 (Comm. Print 2011), available at
http://budget.house.gov/UploadedFiles/ PathToProsperityFY2012.pdf (primarily
the work of Chairman Paul Ryan).
93
See Barack H. Obama, Full Text of President Barack Obama’s Second
Presidential Inaugural Address, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 2 (Jan. 21, 2013),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/21/full-text-of-president-barackobamas-second-inaugural-address_print.html (“The commitments we make to each
other: through Medicare, and Medicaid, and Social Security, these things do not
sap our initiative; they strengthen us. They do not make us a nation of takers; they
free us to take the risks that make this country great.”).
94
H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 92, at 46.
95
See SEN. RON WYDEN & REP. PAUL RYAN, GUARANTEED CHOICES TO
STRENGTHEN MEDICARE AND HEALTH SECURITY FOR ALL 7 (2011), available at
http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/wydenryan.pdf.
Senator
Wyden
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other words, the latest iteration of Ryan’s proposal would actually keep the
existing discombobulated Medicare program in place as long as any
Medicare-eligible retiree, now or in the future, selects it.
X.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREES

As retirees contemplate the accumulated balances in their defined
contribution retirement plans, they must consider how much of those
balances they will need to spend on health care in retirement, which is
likely to be one of their largest budget items. Current cost projections are
undoubtedly understated if past trends are indicative. The history of
medical, and especially pharmacological, progress makes conditions that
were previously untreatable newly treatable if not curable. Newly
concocted drug regimens may be much less expensive than hospitalizations
and their medically intensive therapies, but such drug regimens are not
cheap either. Even though the cost of pharmaceutical interventions is
shared by retirees and the Medicare program, a significant portion of those
costs is paid by the retirees themselves, so increasing drug costs represent a
rising cost burden to retirees generally.
By contrast, most of the money saved by fewer hospitalizations
would have been paid by the Medicare program itself. After the peradmission deductible is paid, most other hospital costs are paid by
Medicare, as noted previously. And if future medical innovations translate
into more nursing home stays instead of hospitalizations, the resulting
nursing home care may not be the “skilled nursing care” that Medicare
pays for.96 Even if it is, Medicare’s liability for such costs is limited to one
hundred days, so any additional days in the nursing home is an expense of
the retiree rather than of Medicare. As a consequence, Medicare’s hospital
expenditures may decrease, but retirees’ outlays for nursing home care will
likely increase. That phenomenon explains, in part, this graph from the
New England Journal of Medicine,97 which shows that the cumulative cost
of a person’s health care expenditures (solid line) increases the longer that
subsequently distanced himself from this proposal. Sen. Wyden Distances Himself
from Medicare Plan He Crafted with Ryan, THE HILL (Aug. 13, 2012, 04:43PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/politics-elections/243387-wyden-downplaysmedicare-plan-he-crafted-with-ryan.
96
See supra text accompanying notes 45–47.
97
Brenda C. Spillman & James Lubitz, The Effect of Longevity on Spending
for Acute and Long-Term Care, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1409, 1411 (2000).
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person lives, but the cumulative cost paid by Medicare (long dash/short
dash line) does not.
Figure 1. Cumulative Health Care Expenditures from the Age of 65 Years
until Death, According to the Type of Health Service and the Age of Death:

In other words, extended longevity may increase per capita medical
expenditures, but much of that increase will not burden the Medicare
program. To put the matter bluntly, the additional medical costs associated
with increased longevity will largely be on the retiree’s dime.
XI.

FUNDING LONG-TERM CARE

Retirees’ responsibility for their own long-term care costs is a
major and largely unrecognized variable in assessing retirement funding
adequacy. This is a huge point, as I explained in my article entitled
“Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care.”98 Not

98

See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap:
Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407 (2007) (examining the

454

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.2

only is Medicare Part A’s coverage of nursing homes severely limited,99 its
coverage of home health care is limited to no more than twenty-eight hours
per week100 of specified types of care101 that are provided by Medicarecertified home health agencies102 pursuant to a physician’s plan of care.103
Moreover, only someone who cannot leave his or her home without
assistance is eligible for this care.104 A joint federal and state government
program called Medicaid105 does cover many forms of long-term care, but
Medicaid has severe assets and income qualification standards106 and as a
result, few retirees plan to avail themselves of its provisions. Moreover,
budgetary pressures on state governments result in ever-tightening
eligibility standards, making Medicaid an increasingly unreliable source for
funding future long-term care needs.107 From the perspective of retirement
security, in other words, the cost of long-term care is essentially a private
expense.
And a considerable expense it can be. According to the most recent
survey of long-term care costs in the United States,108 the median costs of
long-term care are as follows:
•
•
•
•

licensed home health aide – $19 per hour
adult day care – $65 per day
assisted living facility – $3,450 per month, and
nursing home (private room) – $230 per day.

major missing component of retirement planning: how to finance the potentially
explosive cost of long-term care).
99
See supra text accompanying notes 41–50.
100
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m) (2006).
101
Id. § 1395x(m)(1), (2).
102
Id. § 1395x(m), (o).
103
Id. § 1395x(m).
104
Id. §§ 1395f(a)(2)(C), 1395n(a)(2).
105
See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 110–38.
106
See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 423–25. In addition, the value of the benefits
received from Medicaid must be recovered when the Medicaid recipient dies. See
id. at 429–30.
107
See, e.g., Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, 2012 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 120 (enacting tightened restrictions on eligibility for Medicaid
benefits).
108
GENWORTH, GENWORTH 2013 COST OF CARE SURVEY 4 (10th ed. 2013),
available
at
https://www.genworth.com/dam/Americas/US/PDFs/Consumer
/corporate/130568_032213_Cost%20of%20Care_Final_nonsecure.pdf.
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This last amount translates into an annual cost of $83,950. These figures,
moreover, represent national medians, and the cost differentials among
states and within states are considerable.109
A. LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
Private long-term care insurance has been developed to respond to
this need, but its problems are legion. The cost of such insurance is high
and premiums of current policyholders are regularly increased by fifty
percent or more a year.110 Policy options are unstandardized and
confusing,111 and insurer solvency is a major concern112 – especially as
more long-term care insurance companies exit this marketplace.113
Moreover, nearly a quarter of sixty-five-year-olds are medically ineligible
to buy such insurance,114 even if they were willing to bear the associated
expense.
Just the briefest overview of what is involved in acquiring longterm care insurance can be discerned from the following table115 of policy
choices and premiums offered by one prominent insurer:

109

See id. at 14–72 (compilations by cities and states for each care category).
See Do You Need Long-Term-Care Insurance?, CONSUMER REP., Nov.
2003, at 20, 22; see also Jennifer Levitz & Kelly Greene, States Draw Fire for
Pitching Citizens on Private Long-Term Care Insurance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26,
2008, at A1 (reporting a 260% increase in premiums in only three years); Kelly
Greene & Leslie Scism, Long-Term-Care Insurance Leaves Customers Groping,
WALL ST. J., July 2, 2013, at A1 (reporting a 77% increase in one year); see
generally Kaplan, supra note 98, at 440–41.
111
See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 438–39.
112
See id. at 441-42; M.P. McQueen, Insurer Casts Off Long-Term-Care
Policies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2008, at D1.
113
See Kelly Greene, Long-Term Care: What Now?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10,
2012 (noting that ten of the top twenty long-term care insurers by sales volume
have left this market within the past five years).
114
See Christopher M. Murtaugh et al., Risky Business: Long-Term Care
Insurance Underwriting, 32 INQUIRY 271, 277 (1995).
115
See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Your Needs, Plus Your Budget, Equals What to
Pay on Long-Term Care Policy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1997, at C1 (rates for John
Hancock Life Insurance Co.).
110
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ANNUAL COST OF AN INDIVIDUAL POLICY
Age at Issue
$100 daily benefit for nursing-home;
home-health coverage; 4 years coverage;
100-day deductible period
Shorter coverage period: 2 years
Lower home-health-care benefit: $50
daily
Shorter deductible period: 20 days
Richer benefits: $200 daily for nursing
home and home-health care
Inflation-indexed benefits: annual
increases at 5% compounded rate

55

65

75

$510

$990

$2,830

380
410

720
810

2,010
2,350

643
1,020

1,247
1,980

3,566
5,660

1,090

l,740

4,230

The premiums quoted above are over a decade old, and premiums
are undoubtedly higher today, but the long-term care insurance industry
does not generally make price information available outside of a
personalized – read, pressurized – presentation by a sales agent.116 Even so,
this table can convey some of the complex choices that a prospective buyer
of long-term care insurance must confront:
•

•
•
116

Whether to buy a long-term care insurance policy at all, or
plan instead to fund long-term care needs as they arise by
accessing the equity in one’s residence via a “reverse
mortgage.”117
If an insurance policy is desired, how much should the
daily benefit be?
How long should these benefits last?

But see Long-Term Care Sample Rates, CAL. DEP’T OF INS.,
https://interactive.web.insurance.ca.gov/survey/survey?type=longTermCareSurvey
&event=longTermCareSearch (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (making rates available
online for certain specified insurance packages in California); Long-Term Care
Insurance Rate Gide Sample Policy 1, TEX. DEP’T OF INS.,
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/consumer/lrg policy1.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2014) (making rates available in Texas).
117
See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 212–22. Another
possible funding source might be “accelerated benefits” on an existing life
insurance policy that can be accessed for long-term care. See id. at 156–58.
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How long should the deductible or “elimination period”
be?
Should home health care be covered and if so, at what
daily rate?
Should the daily benefit be increased for inflation and if so,
what metric (consumer price index, five percent simple,
five percent compounded) should apply?

There are other policy decisions as well that are not captured by the
preceding chart, such as whether to have premiums waived when benefits
begin, whether to have the premiums refunded if no benefits are ever paid,
and so forth.118 But the main point is that securing insurance to cover
possible long-term care expenses is not a simple or straightforward process.
B. GOVERNMENTAL COVERAGE OF LONG-TERM CARE COSTS
In this context, it is notable that the Affordable Care Act included a
voluntary long-term care insurance program called Community Living
Assistance Services and Supports, or CLASS.119 This program would have
covered some – but not all – long-term care costs in various settings, but its
benefits were targeted to less costly care environments, such as home
health care and community-based services, rather than assisted living
facilities and nursing homes.120 In any case, the enabling legislation
mandated that the CLASS program be fiscally self-sustaining,121 a
requirement that the Obama Administration’s Department of Health and
Human Services determined was impossible to satisfy. In October 2011,
the Secretary of that Department declared that the CLASS program would
not be implemented,122 and these now-moribund provisions were then
118

See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 439.
42 U.S.C. §§ 300ll–300ll-9 (Supp. IV 2007–2011) (enacted as part of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 8002, 124
Stat. 119, 828–47 (2010)).
120
42 U.S.C. §§ 300ll-1, 300ll-2, 300ll-4 (Supp. IV 2007–2011); see generally
Richard L. Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care After Health Care Reform, J.
RETIREMENT PLAN., July–Aug. 2010, at 7.
121
42 U.S.C. § 300ll-7(a), (b) (Supp. IV 2007–2011).
122
See Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
to
Congress
(Oct.
14,
2011),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/blog/ 2011/10/class10142011.html.
119
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repealed by the legislation that forestalled the “fiscal cliff” at the very
beginning of 2013.123 In its place, Congress created that most
quintessentially worthless alternative, a commission to study how longterm care should be financed.124 The bottom line is that the federal
government will probably not be increasing its role in financing long-term
care outside the poverty-based space that is presently occupied by
Medicaid any time soon.
XII.

CONCLUSION

Retirees are never more “on their own” than when they try to cover
their retirement health care expenses. In fact, a comprehensive analysis of
twelve prominent online retirement calculators found that all but two did
not even consider health and long-term care expenses.125 Yet, seniors who
consulted a professional regarding retirement planning indicated that their
number one concern was “the future of Medicare,” followed closely by
“paying for long-term care” and “paying for healthcare.”126 With health
care constituting one of the largest and the least predictable of all
retirement expenses,127 retirees with defined contribution plans will be
increasingly desperate as they contemplate the daunting challenge of
covering these critical costs.

123

American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 642(a),
126 Stat. 2313, 2358.
124
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 643, 126
Stat. 2313, 2358–62.
125
BRYAN DOWD ET AL., AARP PUB. POL. INST., PLANNING FOR RETIREMENT?
WEB CALCULATORS WEAK ON HEALTH COSTS 7–8 (2008), available at
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/ 2008_12_savings.pdf.
126
ALLSUP, ALLSUP MEDICARE ADVISOR® SENIORS SURVEY: MEDICARE
PLANNING AND TRENDS AMONG SENIORS WITH FINANCIAL PLANNERS 7 (2012),
available at http://www.allsup.com/portals/4/AMA-Seniors-Survey-Financial Plan
ners-Oct2012.pdf.
127
See Allison K. Hoffman & Howell E. Jackson, Retiree Out-of-Pocket
Healthcare Spending: A Study of Consumer Expectations and Policy Implications,
39 AM. J.L. & MED. 62, 83–85 (2013) (comparing estimates of future health care
spending of 1,700 near and current retirees with experts’ estimates).

AN AFFORDABLE CARE ACT FOR RETIREMENT PLANS?
AMY B. MONAHAN*
***
In the United States, the availability of tax subsidies for retirement savings
is largely based on an individual’s employment status and whether such
individual’s employer has voluntarily chosen to offer a tax-favored savings
vehicle. Even where an individual has access to an employer-sponsored
retirement plan, such plans are too often suboptimally designed. This
article proposes an incremental reform that ensures universal access to
tax-favored retirement savings irrespective of employment status or
employer decisions. Borrowing from the model of the Affordable Care Act,
the article calls for the creation of an optional, universally available
retirement plan, which would be designed according to both retirement
savings and behavioral best practices. Such a plan would be designed to
increase the number of Americans saving for retirement, as well as the
likelihood that individuals will accumulate sufficient savings to maintain
their standard of living throughout retirement. After discussing the design
details for such a plan, the article concludes by examining the legal and
practical challenges of implementing a universal retirement plan at either
the federal or state level.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Given the current challenges of implementing the Affordable Care
Act (ACA), it is perhaps unwise to suggest that the ACA’s model should be
replicated in the retirement plan context, as the title of this article suggests.
However, the basic structure of the ACA, which provides all Americans
with access to health insurance regardless of their employment status or
their employer’s choices, provides a promising model for enhancing
retirement savings and security.
Many Americans are ill equipped for their retirement, having failed
to save a sufficient amount to maintain their standard of living in
*

Julius E. Davis Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful
to Pat McCoy and the many participants in “The Challenge of Retirement in a
Defined Contribution World” symposium at the University of Connecticut School
of Law who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
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retirement.1 Much blame for this failure has been placed on the widespread
shift in the design of employer-sponsored retirement plans.2 Instead of
being offered traditional, defined benefit pension plans that offer a set level
of lifetime income, most employees are now offered only a defined
contribution plan, usually in the form of a 401(k) plan.3 These defined
contribution plans depend for their success on individual participants
making rational decisions and executing them in a timely manner. Yet,
there is significant evidence suggesting that many individuals fail to make
rational decisions and implement them in a timely manner. As one
prominent scholar succinctly put it, “It’s crazy that we ended up with this
as our retirement system.”4 The popular 401(k) plans, she explained, were
meant to supplement traditional forms of lifetime income, such as social
security and defined benefit pension plans.5 “It was supposed to be money
that you could use to go to Paris. Instead, it’s become our basic system.”6
1

See, e.g., Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The EBRI Retirement
Readiness Rating: Retirement Income Preparation and Future Prospects, 334
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1645412 (estimating that 47.2% of early baby
boomers are at risk of not having sufficient resources to pay for basic retirement
expenditures and uninsured health costs). One large administrator of 401(k) plans
recently reported that average 401(k) plan balances for those age 65-69 were
$136,800. Jill Schlesinger, The Latest on America’s 401(k)s, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27,
2013, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-27/business/sns201302271600--tms--retiresmctnrs-a20130227-20130227_1_retirement-savingsfidelity-plans-fidelity-investments.
2
See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114
YALE L.J. 451 (2004); James M. Poterba, Individual Decision Making and Risk in
Defined Contribution Plans, 13 ELDER L.J. 285 (2005); Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time
to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 305 (2007).
3
Craig Copeland, Retirement Plan Participation and Asset Allocation, 2010,
34 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 9, 11 (2013), available at http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_04_Apr-13_CDHPs-RetPart1.pdf (finding that among
working heads of households who participated in an employer-sponsored
retirement plan, 18.9% participated only in a defined benefit plan, 65%
participated only in a defined contribution plan, and 16.1% participated in both).
4
Jeff Sommer, Suddenly, Many Nest Eggs Look Fragile, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/your-money/suddenly-retiree-nest-eggs
-look-more-fragile.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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While the problems associated with individual retirement savings
decisions are well documented, this article seeks to highlight another
weakness of our current reliance on 401(k) plans to deliver retirement
security – suboptimal employer decision-making. Our retirement savings
system relies on employers voluntarily offering retirement plans. Some
employees do not have access to tax-favored retirement savings plans
simply because their employer does not offer one. And even when
employers do offer a plan, they often offer a plan that is not well-designed
to help participants accumulate sufficient retirement savings. These plans
often minimize employer costs while failing to take into account the
abundant literature on 401(k) plan designs that can help overcome some of
the well-known weaknesses in individual retirement savings decisions. To
address the potential problems with employer decision-making in the
401(k) plan context, this article suggests both federal and state solutions
that borrow from the ACA model for health insurance to ensure that all
Americans who wish to save for retirement have a well-designed option
available to them in the event their employer either fails to offer a plan or
offers a plan that is suboptimally designed. The goal of this proposal is to
minimize both suboptimal participant-level decisions regarding retirement
saving and also suboptimal employer-level decisions regarding plan design.
II.

WEAKNESSES IN THE CURRENT MODEL OF RETIREMENT
SAVINGS

The weaknesses in individual decision-making within participantdirected 401(k) plans are well documented. Individuals struggle to begin
saving at an early enough age to meet their retirement goals, they often fail
to contribute sufficient amounts, and have difficulty navigating investment
and distribution options. Less appreciated is the fact that many employers
make poor decisions when they design their 401(k) plans. This Part will
review the weaknesses in the 401(k) plan model that might explain why so
few Americans appear to be able to achieve financial security through such
plans.
A. INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING
Section 401(k) plans are premised on classic economic theory,
which posits that welfare will be optimized where each individual makes
his or her own rational savings and consumption decisions within a fully
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functioning market.7 The success of a 401(k) plan in providing adequate
retirement income depends on an individual making several important
decisions: whether and when to participate in the plan, what amount of
salary to defer to the plan, where to invest plan contributions, when (if at
all) to access retirement savings prior to retirement, and the rate at which to
withdraw savings once retirement age has been reached. If an individual is
perfectly rational, this type of retirement plan should work very well, as it
can be customized to match the individual’s preferences.8
We have good reason to believe, however, that most individuals
are not perfectly rational and do not make optimal decisions within the
401(k) plan context.9 These problems with participant-level decisionmaking have been well documented elsewhere,10 and therefore this article
provides only a high-level overview of the key findings. For plans that
require an individual to take affirmative action to enroll in the plan,
participants often procrastinate in implementing the decision to participate,
thereby shortening the period of time they are saving for retirement.11 In
addition, many studies have shown that once individuals elect to participate
they are overwhelmed by the decisions they are required to make, such as
selecting a contribution level and making investment decisions, and
therefore stick to the defaults or allow the plan’s framing of choices to

7

See Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives and
Other Imperfect Actors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX REV. 471, 480–81 (2004).
8
See id.
9
See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or for Worse: Default Effects and
401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING (David
A. Wise ed., 2004); Julie R. Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and
Information Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and
Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57 (2005); Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H.
Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior, 21 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 81 (2007); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON.
1149 (2001); Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral
Finance for Retirement Plan Design (Pension Research Council, Working Paper
No. 2003-6, 2003). For a helpful overview of the literature on retirement savings
decisions, see Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and
Behavioral Decision Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOC.
SEC. BULL. 1 (2010).
10
See sources cited supra note 9.
11
Knoll, supra note 9, at 8–9.
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impact their decisions.12 There is also strong evidence that hyperbolic
discounting affects retirement savings decisions causing individuals to give
more weight to current consumption than to future needs, thereby undersaving for retirement.13 Many studies have shown that simply changing
plan defaults results in dramatic changes in behavior – which would not be
predicted under standard economic theory.14 According to standard
economic theory, a rational decision-maker will simply opt out of any
defaults that do not maximize her preferences.15 Yet, the evidence on the
impact of defaults in the retirement savings context suggests that cognitive
biases are impacting many individuals’ decision-making.16
B. EMPLOYER DECISION-MAKING
A less explored weakness inherent in relying on 401(k) plans to
provide retirement security is the fact that they depend on sound employer
decision-making.17 In theory, employers should act as effective agents for
their employees and offer retirement plans that maximize their employees’
preferences.18 But there are various reasons why employers may not, in
fact, offer plans designed to produce adequate retirement income. The
subparts below illustrate the ways in which employer decision-making can
negatively impact employees’ retirement security.
1. Failing to Offer a Plan
Employers are not required to offer any type of retirement plan to
their workers. It is a completely voluntary decision, driven by labor market
12

See, e.g., Agnew & Szykman, supra note 9, at 66; Choi et al., supra note 9,

at 125.
13

See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112
Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997).
14
See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 9.
15
See id. at 81.
16
See id. See also Madrian & Shea, supra note 9.
17
For an examination of the role of employers in employees’ health and
retirement security, see Amy B. Monahan, Employers as Risks, 89 CHI. KENT L.
REV. 751 (2014).
18
See Gregory Acs & Eugene Steuerle, The Corporation as Dispenser of
Welfare and Security, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY: EXAMINING THE
QUESTIONS OF POWER AND EFFICIENCY AT THE CENTURY'S END 360, 361 (Carl
Kaysen, ed. 1996).
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pressures.19 We would expect an employer to voluntarily offer a retirement
plan in lieu of other forms of compensation where it believes that doing so
will help it attract and retain workers.20 Indeed, pension formation is
typically explained as a contract driven by worker demand to provide
workers with security and income protection.21 But it is widely
acknowledged that pensions also offer other benefits to employers, in
addition to simply helping them attract and retain employees. For example,
pensions can help employers control their employees’ tenure and turnover
by designing plans to encourage retirement at certain ages.22
But allowing labor market pressures to determine whether a
retirement plan is offered has shortcomings. It aggregates the preferences
of employees. If the majority of employees of a given employer do not
value retirement benefits, the employer is unlikely to offer a plan. For
those minority employees that would value a retirement plan, their only
option would be to find a different employer that offers the desired
benefits. Because many factors enter into a decision to work at one firm
over another, it may be that many who desire a retirement plan are not
offered one. And bear in mind that a job switch is in fact the only complete
solution if an employee’s current employer fails to offer a retirement plan.
While there are individual tax-favored retirement accounts available
outside of the employment context, none can duplicate the extent of the tax
benefits available to employer plans. An employee can currently defer up
to $17,500 of her salary tax-free per year to a 401(k) plan,23 but can only
contribute $5,500 annually to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA).24
Prior to health care reform, we saw the same dynamic at play in an
employer’s decision to offer a health plan to employees. Employers
19

See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 2 (1992).
20
See Alan L. Gustman et al., The Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A
Survey of the Literature, 47 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 417, 426 (1994).
21
GHILARDUCCI, supra note 19. For alternative explanations of pension
formation, see id. at 2–7.
22
Id. at 2–3.
23
I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86 (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/
IRS-Announces-2014-Pension-Plan-Limitations;-Taxpayers-May-Contribute-upto-$17,500-to-their-401(k)-plans-in-2014. Participants who are age fifty or older
are permitted to contribute an addition $5,500 each year, for a total of $23,000 per
year. Id.
24
Id. Participants who are age fifty or older may contribute an additional
$1,000 per year to an IRA, for a total annual contribution of $6,500. Id.
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decided to offer a health plan based on labor market pressures,25 and
employees had little ability to replicate the benefits of an employer plan by
seeking individual level coverage.26 Health care reform will change this
reliance on employers, as discussed in more detail in Part II.
2. Offering a Suboptimal Plan
Even if an employer offers a retirement plan, it may nevertheless
be the case that an employer offers a plan that, from an employee’s
perspective, is suboptimally designed. Employers offer retirement plans in
order to recruit and retain valued workers. Retirement plans help recruit
and retain workers when workers find them to be a positive addition to
their compensation package. Employers should therefore structure their
retirement plans in a way that employees find attractive.27 In other words,
we would expect employers to be effective agents for their employees
when they design their retirement plans.28 Employees, however, are
unlikely to be familiar with all of the features of their retirement plan, and
are likely, when evaluating an employer plan, to focus on only a few
features that are highly salient to employees.29 For example, it seems
plausible that employees would focus on whether a plan is offered at all,
and the amount and structure of any employer contributions to the plan,
such as matching or profit sharing contributions. Most employees, when
deciding whether to accept or retain an offer of employment from a firm,
probably do not examine plan details such as plan defaults, the quality of
plan investments, investment fees, or forms of distribution. If employers
believe or discover that employees focus only on a handful of highly salient
features, employers are likely to respond by structuring their plans only
around those features and otherwise acting to minimize their costs. For
example, an employer might offer a 401(k) plan with a matching
25

See, e.g., Michael Chernew et al., Quality and Employers' Choice
of Health Plans, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 471, 472 (2004).
26
See Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1944 (2013).
27
For an overview of pension theories, see GHILARDUCCI, supra note 19, at 1–
7.
28
See Chernew et al., supra note 24, at 472.
29
See James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25
J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 199 (1998) (discussing that increased numbers of
alternatives facing the consumer when choosing retirement products lead to a
greater use of non-compensatory strategies which eliminate alternatives).
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contribution that equals or exceeds that offered by its competitor firms, but
in order to reduce its costs associated with the plan might select a plan
provider that offers high fee investments, defaults that do not address
participants’ likely cognitive biases, and distribution forms that do not help
participants manage income in retirement. The end result may be that even
where employers offer plans, they offer plans that are not designed to
maximize participants’ retirement security.
Again, much the same dynamic is at play in how employers
approach health plan design. Employees are likely to focus only on highly
salient features when evaluating a health plan – in this case on premium
levels, copays, and whether their current doctor is in-network.30 And
employers are likely to respond to this employee focus by designing plans
around the highly salient features, potentially at the expense of other
important plan design features such as the quality of the plan or providers.31
If this hypothesis regarding employer plan design is correct, the
implications for retirement and health security are significant. In the
retirement plan context, it would mean that even if every employer made a
401(k) plan available to its workers, the problem of insufficient retirement
savings would not be solved. While we know relatively little regarding
how employer plan design decisions are made and the factors that motivate
those design decisions, data regarding plan features provide support for the
hypothesis that the majority of employers do not offer plans that are
optimally designed. Plans often have defaults that work against retirement
savings. Individuals that desire to participate must take active steps to
enroll in the plan, instead of being defaulted into participation.32 Even
where participants are automatically enrolled in a plan, default contribution

30

See Amy B. Monahan, Why Tax High-Cost Employer Health Plans?, 65
TAX L. REV. 749, 764–765 (2012).
31
See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient
Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market
Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1999) (explaining how health insurance
companies are likely to structure health plans given consumers’ focus on only a
handful of highly salient features).
32
See Alicia H. Munnell, 401(k) Plans in 2010: An Update from the SCF,
ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. C., Boston, MA), July 2012, at 1, 4,
available
at
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/IB_12-13-508.pdf
(finding that fewer than half of all 401(k) plans offered automatic enrollment in
2010).
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rates are often too low to provide adequate savings.33 Many plans allow
easy access to savings prior to retirement,34 and nearly all have a lump sum
distribution as either the default or the only form of distribution available.35
In addition, plans sometimes work against participants’ savings
goals by offering poor investment choices and little investment advice.36
As we have seen through countless class action lawsuits, many employers
allegedly offer a menu of investments that charge excessive fees.37
33

See id. See also DELOITTE, ANNUAL 401(K) BENCHMARKING SURVEY 9
(2012),
available
at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Consulting/us_cons_hc_401ksbecnchm
arkingsurvey2012.pdf (finding that the average default contribution rate was 3%,
an amount unlikely “to support a comfortable retirement”).
34
For example, approximately 90% of 401(k) plan participants participate in a
plan that offers plan loans. John Beshears et al., The Availability and Utilization of
401(k) Loans 2 (John. F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. 11-023,
2011), available at https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id
=693. Sixty-six percent of all 401(k) plans permit participants to take hardship
distributions prior to retirement. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SECTION 401(K)
COMPLIANCE CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE FINAL REPORT 6 (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/401k_final_report.pdf. Studies are, however,
mixed on the extent to which such pre-retirement access threatens retirement
security. See generally sources cited infra note 64.
35
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 34, at 59 (finding that 99% of
401(k) plans offer a lump sum distribution, while only 19% offer a qualified joint
and survivor annuity). See also HEWITT ASSOC., TRENDS AND EXPERIENCES IN
401(K) PLANS 7 (2009) available at http://www.retirementmadesimpler.org/
Library/Hewitt_Research_Trends_in_401k_Highlights.pdf (finding that all 401(k)
plans offered a lump sum option, while 14% offered annuities).
36
See, e.g., James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for
Employees, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 511–12 (2013) (examining the weaknesses of
401(k) investment options); Karen Blumenthal, Thanks but No Thanks on 401(k)
Advice, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052970204346104576638933476020932 (finding that while a
majority of 401(k) plans offer investment advice, only around a quarter of
participants offered some form of investment advice utilize the service).
37
For a detailed examination of this litigation and its effects, see Mercer
Bullard, The Social Costs of Choice, Free Market Ideology and the Empirical
Consequences of the 401(k) Plan Large Menu Defense, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 335
(2014) and Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive
Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans 13-20 (Feb.
21,
2014
(unpublished
manuscript)
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399531. See also Kelly
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Employers often offer employer stock as an investment option, even though
in many cases it is unwise for a participant who depends on an employer
for her current income to invest in that employer’s stock for her long-term
savings.38 And finally, plans are permitted to, and often do, pass along to
participants nearly all of the administrative costs of running the plan,
further reducing participants’ rate of return.39
There has been one area of plan design that has improved
significantly over the last decade. Beginning in the 1990s, several 401(k)
plan sponsors began experimenting with automatic enrollment provisions,
which provide that an eligible participant will automatically participate in
the employer’s plan unless he or she takes affirmative action to opt out.40
The number of employers utilizing automatic enrollment grew following
the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which offered
employers various incentives for putting such procedures in place.
However, a well-known potential weakness of automatic enrollment
provisions is that plan sponsors can choose default contribution levels and
investment options that are too low and too conservative to produce
adequate retirement savings. When automatic enrollment provisions first
gained traction in the late 1990s and early 2000s, default investment
options were primarily conservative, capital-preserving investments.41
However, a recent survey found that 82% of plans with automatic
enrollment now had as their default investment option a lifecycle or targetdate fund, designed to invest appropriately given the participant’s years to
Greene, Letters About 401(k) Plan Costs Stir Tempest, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323971204578626103409
341648 (describing Yale Law Professor Ian Ayres’ letter writing campaign to
401(k) plan sponsors regarding their fee levels, and the reaction such letters have
provoked).
38
See generally Ning Tang et al., The Efficiency of Sponsor and Participant
Portfolio Choices in 401(k) Plans, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073 (2010).
39
See DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 19 (finding that 51% of plans paid all
administrative and recordkeeping fees through investment revenue).
40
See Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The Impact of PPA on Retirement
Savings for 401(k) Participants, 318 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1, 4
(2008), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_06-20087.pdf.
41
See PROFIT SHARING/401(K) COUNCIL OF AMERICA, AUTOMATIC
ENROLLMENT 2001: A STUDY OF AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT PRACTICES IN 401(K)
PLANS available at http://www.pcsa.org/data/autoenroll2001.asp (finding that
among plans with automatic enrollment, 66% had a conservative default
investment option such as a stable value or money market fund).
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retirement.42 Note, however, that this change was likely brought about by a
change in Department of Labor regulations that protected plan fiduciaries
from liability where they offered a “qualified investment” as the default
investment option.43 This change does not appear to have been the result of
employers independently making a decision to improve the quality of the
plan’s default investment option. As a result, this improvement does not
provide significant evidence against the hypothesis that employers often
lack motivation to design optimal retirement plans. Indeed, when the state
of 401(k) plan design is viewed as a whole, it seems reasonable to conclude
that even when participants are lucky enough to be offered an employersponsored retirement plan, that plan in many cases will not be designed to
maximize retirement security.
III.

THE ACA MODEL

While there is reason to be less than confident in our current
retirement savings system, the structure of federal health care reform
provides an interesting model of how dependence on employers can be
reduced, and portions of its structure might successfully be borrowed to
improve retirement savings. As noted above, there are important
similarities between employer-sponsored health and retirement plans. Both
types of plans depend on employer decision-making for their success. An
employer must decide to offer a plan if an employee is to have access to the
benefit at all, since neither type of plan can be duplicated outside of the
employment context.44 And the quality of the benefit provided depends in
large part on how employers decide to structure the benefit plan. If an
employer makes suboptimal choices in a health plan, an individual’s health
42

See DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 11.
Default Investment Alternatives Under Participant Directed Individual
Account Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2008). Each of the three qualified default
investment options is diversified in order to minimize the risk of large losses but
also to provide long-term growth potential.
44
Health plans, like retirement plans, depend on employer sponsorship for the
individual to receive the most favorable tax treatment. If an employee buys health
insurance on her own, she must pay for the coverage with after-tax dollars,
whereas an employee who participates in an employer plan may pay premiums
with pre-tax dollars. This tax advantage did not change with the passage of the
ACA. In addition, purchasing coverage through an employer gives the employee
access to group coverage, which tends to be more affordable than individual
coverage. See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 26, at 1942–44.
43
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security can be jeopardized, much the same way an individual’s retirement
security can be compromised if an employer designs a suboptimal
retirement plan.
For health plans, however, this should begin to change as the major
reforms of the ACA take effect.45 Once the ACA’s provisions are fully
effective, individuals who are not offered health coverage through an
employer, or are offered a plan that does not satisfy their preferences,
should have a meaningful coverage alternative. Such individuals can freely
purchase any individual coverage available on their state’s health insurance
exchange46 and, assuming these markets function well post-reform, should
have a broad variety of plan designs and premium levels from which to
choose.47 The ACA requires all plans sold on the state exchanges (referred
to as “qualified health plans”) to satisfy various plan design, content and
quality requirements in order to ensure that the options available meet
minimum standards.48 In other words, one underappreciated function of the
ACA is to act as a backstop for employer choices that might be suboptimal
from an employee’s perspective. While not perfect (an employee
purchasing health insurance on an exchange would have to purchase
coverage with after-tax instead of pre-tax dollars), the ACA should give an
individual a much greater ability to secure desired health care coverage
without regard to his or her employer’s choices.49 For example, if an
employee is offered health insurance coverage by her employer that has a
deductible too high for the employee to afford, or that fails to offer a broad
network of providers, that employee is no longer effectively stuck with
what the employer offers, but will instead have the option of going to her
state’s health insurance exchange and buying coverage that satisfies her
preferences.
The ACA’s provision of a universal option available to all
individuals without regard to employment status or employer decisionmaking provides an interesting model that might be of use in improving
retirement security in the United States. Part IV below explores ways in
45

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
46
See 42 U.S.C. 18031(b) (Supp. V 2012).
47
See 42 U.S.C. 18022 (Supp. V 2012).
48
See id.
49
For a discussion of some of the implications of these choices, see Brendan
S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchanges: Choice, Defaults, and the
Unconnected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099 (2012).
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which both the federal and state governments could borrow from the ACA
to provide a meaningful alternative to suboptimal employer-sponsored
retirement plans.
IV.

A UNIVERSAL BACKSTOP RETIREMENT PLAN

Both the federal and state governments have the ability to use law
to improve retirement security for many Americans. This Part begins by
exploring the use of a universal “backstop” retirement plan, similar to the
concept of a qualified health plan under the ACA, which could help to
address the problem of flawed employer decision-making. It then discusses
the possibilities and impediments associated with establishing such a
backstop at either the federal or state level.
A. BACKSTOP RETIREMENT PLAN DESIGN
There are myriad problems in our current retirement savings
system. Employer plans provide the greatest tax benefit for retirement
savings, but are far from universal.50 Even when employer plans are
available, they are often not designed to address the well-documented
mistakes that individuals make in their retirement savings decisions.51
While there are Individual Retirement Accounts universally available, these
savings vehicles have much lower contribution limits than employersponsored plans,52 involve even more complex participant decision-making

50

See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. & MATHEW GREENWALD & ASSOCS.,
2013 RCS FACT SHEET #3, at 5 (2013), available at http://ebri.org/pdf/surveys/
rcs/2013/Final-FS.RCS-13.FS_3.Saving.FINAL.pdf. (reporting that only 72% of
workers are offered a retirement plan by their employer); See Emp. Benefit
Research Inst., Pension Plan Participation, FAST FACTS (Emp. Benefit Research
Inst., Washington, D.C.), March 28, 2013, available at http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/FF.225.DB-DC.28Mar13.pdf. (finding that in 2011, 3% of private sector
workers participated in a defined benefit plan, 11% participated in both a defined
benefit and defined contribution plan, and 31% participated only in a defined
contribution plan).
51
See supra Part II.B.2.
52
See I.R.S. Notice 2012-67, 2012-50 I.R.B. 671 (stating that in 2013,
individuals can contribute $17,500 to an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan, but can
contribute only $5,500 to an IRA).
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than employer plans,53 and are not designed to counteract cognitive biases
in retirement savings decisions.54
There are many ways to address the perceived shortcomings of our
current system. We could reform Social Security so that it provided more
complete income replacement in retirement. We could implement a
government-sponsored, universal pension plan.
We could raise
contribution limits on IRAs. The proposal offered in this article is an
incremental reform that is based on the premise that 401(k) plans, and
defined contribution retirement plans in general, are here to stay and that a
wholesale shift away from either defined contribution plans or employerprovided plans is unlikely to be politically viable. Instead, the universal
backstop retirement plan is designed to work within the existing employerbased system to ensure that all individuals have access to a quality
retirement plan designed to maximize the likelihood that a participant will
have adequate income in retirement. The goal is, as best we can, to
minimize both suboptimal participant-level decisions regarding saving and
investing and suboptimal employer-level decisions regarding plan design.
As the ACA will do for health plans, the idea of a backstop
retirement plan is to have a plan available to all individuals, regardless of
whether they are employed or have access to other retirement plans through
an employer. It is offering a new option, not supplanting the existing
system. One significant advantage of this type of reform is that it lets the
backstop plan compete against employer offerings. It lets participants
choose the plan that best meets their needs. In this way, a backstop
retirement plan is superior to direct regulation of employer plan offerings.
Employers remain free to design a plan that best meets the needs of their
53

The decision-making process to establish and fund an IRA is more
complicated than participation in a 401(k) plan because there are a greater number
of options. An IRA can be established with numerous investment firms, in contrast
to an employer that would offer only a single plan. And once an IRA provider is
selected, an individual can essentially invest her contributions in any publicly
traded security – making the investment decision more complex compared with a
401(k) plan that often offers a limited menu of investment options.
54
Because IRAs must be initiated and established by an individual, design
features such as automatic enrollment, automatically increasing contribution rates,
and default investment options typically cannot be utilized. This could change if
the law required the establishment of so-called payroll IRAs or automatic IRAs,
recently proposed by President Obama. See Retirement Security for American
Families, WHITEHOUSE.GOV 3, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/
Retirement_Savings_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
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employees, or even forgo a plan, but employees will not bear any ill
consequences of the employer’s decision. In fact, the backstop retirement
plan may incent some employers to improve their plan offerings. It is
possible, of course, that employers may drop their retirement plans if a
backstop retirement plan becomes available. It is important to note that this
is not necessarily a bad outcome, if the backstop plan is appropriately
designed. Employers dropping retirement plans is only problematic if their
doing so leaves employees worse off with respect to retirement savings.
An appropriately designed backstop plan, as discussed in more detail
below, should prevent such an outcome.
While in reality designing a backstop plan would be a difficult
process relying on input from many experts and stakeholders, I offer here
some initial thoughts on basic approaches to the backstop plan and issues to
be considered. Some of the design features mentioned would require
changes to either federal or state law, an issue I discuss in the next subpart.
The first issue to tackle would be designing the plan to encourage
participation. The evidence seems clear that automatic participation, with
the ability to opt-out, would be preferable to requiring affirmative action to
begin saving.55 But given that this is a backstop plan, and not merely the
plan of a single employer, implementing automatic enrollment is
complicated. We have three potential categories of participants: employees
who have access to an employer-sponsored plan, employees without an
employer plan, and self-employed individuals. It would be easiest to
implement automatic enrollment for employed individuals without access
to an employer plan. Those individuals could simply be defaulted into the
backstop plan through required payroll deduction. For those employees
who are offered an employer plan, the question becomes which plan they
should be automatically enrolled in – the backstop plan or the employer
plan? The best approach for an employee would depend on how the
employer plan compares to the backstop plan, so that is of little help in
determining the default. One simple solution would be to default the
employee into the backstop plan only if the employer plan does not provide
for automatic enrollment. For self-employed individuals, automatic
55

See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow:
Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON.
S164, S169 (2004); John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for
Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in SOCIAL
SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167–95 (Jeffrey Brown et al.
eds., 2009).
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enrollment is impossible to implement because payroll deduction is not
practical. But there are other methods to encourage participation. Selfemployed individuals could face a small fee for failing to participate in the
plan (or an equivalent retirement savings vehicle), or they could be
required to state when filing their federal tax return whether they wish to
participate in the plan, and be given the ability to direct any tax refund to
the backstop plan. These are not ideal, of course, but illustrations of how
participation can be encouraged without the ease of payroll deduction.
After tackling the issue of getting individuals into the backstop
plan, the next design issue is contributions, both participant and employer.
Ideally, the default contribution level for participants would be a
percentage of wages which, if contributed over an average working life,
and taking into account an appropriate investment return assumption,
would result in a level of income replacement at retirement that would be
sufficient to provide seventy to eighty percent of pre-retirement income for
the average life expectancy.56 Obviously, such a contribution level would
not be ideal for everyone, and in fact may be so large as to result in
participants either dropping out of the plan entirely or lowering their
contribution rate.57 Further study would be necessary to select a
contribution rate that would maximize plan participation and contribution
rates. One possibility would be to adjust the contribution rate based on a

56

Financial planners often suggest that, for most individuals, retirement
savings should aim to replace 70% to 80% of pre-retirement income, although this
is at best a rough guide. See, e.g., Jason Jenkins, The New Rule of Thumb for
Retirement Savings, INVESTMENT U (2012), available at http://www.investmentu.
com/2012/October/new-rule-of-thumb-for-retirement-savings.html. For a more
sophisticated analysis of retirement savings needs, see Jonathan Skinner, Are You
Sure You’re Saving Enough for Retirement? (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 12981, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w
12981.pdf?new_window=1.
57
See Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 55, at S169–72 (citing behavioral
analysis which indicates that many individuals who perceive themselves as unable
to meet current expenditures will not be interested in increasing their participation
in savings plans if a rate above their perceived ability to save is suggested); See
Beshears et al., supra note 55, at 171 (noting that employers often set automatic
enrollment contribution levels low due to the commonly held belief that high
contribution levels will encourage employees to opt out).
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participant’s income.58 Another well-tested plan design would be to start
participants at a low initial contribution rate, and increase that contribution
rate automatically at specified intervals to gradually bring a participant to
an adequate savings level.59
It is important that employers be able to contribute to an
employee’s account in the backstop plan. It is easy to imagine that many
employers would, if a backstop retirement plan were in place, no longer
sponsor their own 401(k) plan. But without the ability of employers to
contribute directly to their employees’ retirement, an important source of
savings would be lost. Therefore, making it easy (and tax advantaged) for
an employer to contribute to an employee’s retirement savings, whether
through an employer-sponsored plan or the backstop plan, would be an
important design feature.
Assuming that participation is encouraged at an adequate savings
rate, the next design issue, and potentially the most difficult one, is to
determine both the default and alternative investment options. The ideal
default investment is likely a passive fund that offers the appropriate mix of
risk and return characteristics appropriate for the individual’s savings
horizon.60 Target date funds, which are designed to automatically shift the
fund’s asset allocation as the target retirement date nears, are attractive
because they are designed around the participant’s investment time
horizon, and they offer one-stop shopping.61 Theoretically, a participant
could put all of their savings in a single target date fund. These funds are
not without risks,62 but they may provide a better default option than others
readily available.63
58

Varying contribution rates by income level may be more palatable to lowincome individuals, and could also be designed to reflect the fact that social
security replaces a larger percentage of income for low-income individuals.
59
A plan design with automatically increasing contribution rates was
pioneered by economists Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi. See Thaler &
Benartzi, supra note 55.
60
See Kwak, supra note 36.
61
Julie R. Agnew et al., What People Know About Target-Date Funds: Survey
and Focus Group Evidence 4 (Fin. Sec. Project at B.C., Working Paper 2011-2),
available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/FSP-WP-2011-2.pdf.
62
See Zvi Bodie et al., Unsafe at Any Speed? The Designed-in Risks of TargetDate Glide Paths, J. FIN. PLAN. (March 15, 2010), available at http://www.fpanet
.org/journal/CurrentIssue/TableofContents/UnsafeatAnySpeed/.
63
Zvi Bodie et al., Life Cycle Finance and the Design of Pension Plans, 1
ANN. REV. OF FIN. ECON. 249, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

476

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.2

An important issue worth considering is whether the backstop plan
should not have participant-directed investment, but should instead operate
as a cash balance plan, where participants are guaranteed a rate of return on
their contributions.64 If a cash balance approach is taken, participants would
not face significant investment risk, a distinct advantage over current
401(k) plans.65 The price, of course, is that such plans typically have
conservative rates of return, which may be insufficient to provide adequate
retirement income given reasonable contribution rates.66 Another option
would be to default participants into the cash balance plan and allow
individuals to opt out of the cash balance plan and into a participantdirected 401(k) plan if desired. Doing so would allow more sophisticated
investors to seek higher rates of return than the cash balance plan offers,
while still offering unsophisticated or risk-adverse investors a guaranteed
rate of return.
Another approach to participant investments would be to invest
contributions in deferred life annuities, similar to a recent proposal by
Senator Hatch for public pension plans.67 Investing contributions in
annuities would both protect employees against investment risk and
provide them with a guaranteed income stream at retirement. However,
like the cash balance option described above, such a structure would not
necessarily guarantee that the amount of the income stream would be
adequate.

abstract_id=1396835. For an interesting example of an investment option that
utilizes both target date funds and annuities that provide a guaranteed level of
lifetime income, see Tara Seigel Bernard, A 401(k) That Promises Never to Run
Dry: [Your Money], N.Y. TIMES Nov. 14, 2012, at F.4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/11/14/your-money/a-401-k-that-promises-incomefor-life.html?r=0.
64
Kevin E. Cahill & Mauricio Soto, How Do Cash Balance Plans Affect the
Pension Landscape?, AN ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. For Ret. Research. Bos. Coll.,
Boston, MA), Dec. 2003, at 1, 1.
65
See id. at 3; Richard W. Johnson & Cori E. Uccello, Cash Balance Plans:
What Do They Mean For Retirement Security?, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 315, 316–18
(2004).
66
See Cahill & Soto, supra note 64 at 3 (noting that cash balance plans on
average offer a 5.6% rate of return, compared to a market-average rate of return of
7.6%).
67
See The Secure Annuities for Employees Retirement Act, S. 1270, 113th
Cong. (2013).
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The final major design decision concerns plan distributions, both
before and during retirement. Allowing easy access to retirement savings
prior to retirement may significantly endanger retirement security.68
However, individuals may be more likely to participate in the first place if
they know that they can access their savings in the event of a financial
hardship.69 To balance these competing concerns, the plan could offer preretirement distributions only for specific financial hardships,70 instead of
offering relatively unrestricted pre-retirement access as many employer
401(k) plans do currently.71 Consideration should be given to whether preretirement access should only be the form of plan loans,72 or whether an
outright distribution will be permitted, and in what circumstances.
The other major design decision with respect to distributions will
be the form of retirement distributions. Most participants in 401(k) plans
receive lump sum distributions.73 However, what most individuals require
68

See Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sundén, 401(k) Plans Are Still Coming Up
Short, ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research Bos. C., Boston, MA), Mar. 2006, at
1, 5, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2006/03/ib_43.pdf.
69
The evidence regarding whether or to what extent access to funds preretirement increases participation are mixed. Compare Alicia H. Munnell et al.,
What Determines 401(k) Participation and Contributions? 16 (Ctr. for Ret.
Research Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 2000-12, 2000), available at http://
crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2000/12/wp_2000-12.pdf (“the ability to borrow
increases the contribution rate by about 1 percentage point”), with U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(K) PENSION PLANS: LOAN PROVISIONS ENHANCE
PARTICIPATION BUT MAY AFFECT INCOME SECURITY FOR SOME 5 (1997),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98005.pdf (“[p]articipation rates
in plans with loan provisions are about 6 percentage points higher than plans with
no loan provisions”).
70
The IRS publishes a list of “safe harbor” reasons for hardship distributions,
which could be used in the loan context as well. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)1(d)(3)(iii) (2011).
71
PROFIT SHARING/401(K) COUNCIL OF AM., PLAN LOAN RESTRICTION STUDY
(1999), available at http://www.psca.org/RESEARCHDATA/PlanLoanRestriction
Study/tabid/176/Default.aspx (reporting that 82% of plans did not place restrictions
on the purposes for which a plan loan would be granted).
72
Loans have the advantage of allowing the participant to return the retirement
savings to the plan with interest, but loan repayment may not be possible in some
financial circumstances.
73
See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULL. NO.
2749, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: HEALTH AND RETIREMENT PLAN
PROVISIONS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 125 (2010),
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in retirement is lifetime income.74 For this reason, having a life annuity as
the default form of retirement distribution likely makes the most sense,
with notice and consent required for other forms of distributions such as
lump sum or installments.75
1. A Federal Backstop?
With the design basics in place, the next issue to consider is
whether a backstop plan is best offered at the federal or state level. A
backstop retirement plan created at the federal level has some advantages
over state-based plans. Assuming there is political will to put such a plan
in place, the federal government could easily pass a law establishing the
backstop plan that has the basic design features described above. States, on
the other hand, would have to work around existing federal law to put such
a plan in place, as is discussed in more detail below. A federal plan may
also make sense given that retirement savings goals and related plan design
likely do not vary significantly by state, as some other types of programs
might, and there are also likely to be economies of scale associated with a
single backstop plan, versus fifty individual plans.
The biggest impediment to establishing a federal backstop plan, in
addition to political will, is the cost. Assuming that the backstop plan
would involve extending the tax benefits of employer-sponsored plans to
available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/detailedprovisions/2009/ebbl0045.pdf
(finding that 90% of plan participants had a lump sum distribution option, while
27% were offered installments and 15% were offered an annuity); VANGUARD,
DISTRIBUTION DECISIONS AMONG RETIREMENT-AGE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
PLAN PARTICIPANTS 6 (2010), available at https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/
pdf/CRRDDP.pdf (finding that only 2% of retirement-aged participants elected
installments, whereas 47% took a lump sum distribution and the remainder left
their account in the plan).
74
See Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Converting 401(k)
Accounts into Federally Guaranteed Lifetime Annuities, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
277, 285–86 (2010) (explaining the process of managing retirement wealth to
produce an income stream in retirement).
75
While legislative action to require annuities does not seem imminent, the
Department of Labor has recently proposed regulations that would require defined
contribution plans to provide on participant’s benefit statements an estimated
lifetime income stream based on current retirement savings. Pension Benefit
Statements, 78 Fed. Reg. 26727, 26737–38 (proposed May 8, 2013) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2520).
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the backstop plan, the cost of an already expensive tax expenditure would
increase.76 Given our current fiscal realities, it may be difficult to persuade
Congress to spend money now in order to save money on supporting
retirees in the future.
One potentially revenue-neutral way to expand tax benefits to the
backstop plan would be to lower the current 401(k) deferral limits. In other
words, to shift some of the current tax benefits available exclusively to
employer-provided plans to a wider population. While there are sound
equity-based arguments for lowering the tax benefit but extending it to a
wider population, objections might be raised that doing so would have the
perverse effect of lowering existing rates of retirement savings by those in
employer plans. Further study would be necessary to better understand the
effects of shifting the tax benefit. The maximum salary deferral in 2014 is
$17,500, but historical data shows that few participants contribute the
maximum amount.77 Not surprisingly, the number of participants
contributing the maximum amount to a 401(k) plan is closely correlated to
income level.78 While twenty-eight percent of those earning $100,000 or
more contribute the maximum amount to a 401(k) plan, only one percent of
those earning between $40,000 and $60,000 do so.79 On average,
participants contribute between 7.5 and 8% of their income.80 These data
suggest that the maximum pre-tax deferral to 401(k) plans could be
lowered without adversely affecting the majority of participants, and the
minority that would be affected would be relatively high-income

76

The tax expenditure for employer-sponsored defined contribution plans is
estimated to be $57 billion in 2013. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG.,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, at 39
(Comm. Print 2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=start
down&id=4503.
77
See Munnell, supra note 32, at 5.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
See Craig Copeland, 401(k)-Type Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs), EBRI NOTES (Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2007,
at 1, 6, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRI_Notes_10a-2007.pdf (reporting
average deferral rate of 7.5%); Fidelity Average 401(k) Balance Climbs to Record
High at End of 2012, FIDELITY.COM (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.fidelity.com/
inside-fidelity/employer-services/fidelity-analysis-finds-record-high-average-401kbalance (reporting 8% average annual deferral rate among Fidelity 401(k) plan
participants).
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participants (who are likely to save for retirement even in the absence of a
tax benefit).81
Another way to address the tax issue would be to structure the plan
as an after-tax plan. One way to do so, which would require no change to
tax laws, would be to have contributions to the plan be made on an after-tax
basis and have participants subject to capital gains taxation when gains or
losses are realized.82 Another option would be for Congress to make the
plan operate like a Roth IRA, where contributions are after-tax, but
distributions are tax-free.83
2. A State Backstop?
Theoretically, states could take legislative action to do much the
same thing as the federal solutions described above. States could create
their own state-based retirement plan available to all workers, designed to
produce adequate income replacement for the average worker. But
implementing a state-based solution is difficult because of current federal
limitations. First, the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), preempts any state law that “relates to” an employee benefit
plan.84 Without getting into the complex details of ERISA preemption,
suffice it to say that a state law that required employer participation in a
retirement plan or significantly penalized an employer for failing to
participate in a retirement plan would be preempted by ERISA.85 As a
81

See generally Eric M. Engen et al., The Illusory Effects of Saving Incentives
on Saving, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (1996) (examining whether and to what extent
tax incentives increase the level of retirement savings).
82
Depending on the investment strategy pursued, conventional savings
accounts without tax deferral can be just as tax efficient as tax-favored accounts
that tax gains at ordinary rather than capital gains rates. See generally, John B.
Shoven & Clemens Sialm, Asset Location in Tax-Deferred and Conventional
Savings Accounts, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 23 (2003) (describing how locating assets
optimally can significantly improve the risk-adjusted performance of retirement
saving).
83
For an overview of the relative tax advantages of Roth IRAs, see Leonard E.
Burman et al., The Taxation of Retirement Saving: Choosing Between FrontLoaded and Back-Loaded Options, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 689 (2001).
84
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
85
For a more detailed overview of ERISA preemption in this context, see
Edward A. Zelinsky. California Dreaming: The California Secure Choice
Retirement Savings Trust Act, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 547 (2014).
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result, states would be unable to require employer contributions to a state
retirement plan, although they should be able to require employers to
facilitate payroll deduction contributions to a state retirement plan.
In addition, the federal tax code currently grants tax benefits for
retirement savings in limited circumstances – either when an employer plan
is utilized, or when a qualified individual retirement account is used. As a
result, if a state were to adopt a state-based retirement plan, it may not be
able to take advantage of federal income tax preferences. A state backstop
retirement plan would not be an employer-provided plan, and therefore
would be ineligible for existing federal tax benefits for employer plans.
And while the state plan might be able to qualify as an IRA, structuring the
plan in such a way would likely prohibit the use of a cash balance design,86
and would only provide the lower tax benefits available to IRA holders.87
Still, there is some reason to believe that this is an area where
states may be more interested and nimble than the federal government.
Indeed, California has passed a law requiring employers to either sponsor a
retirement plan or participate in a state-based retirement plan.88 That law,
however, is effectively on hold until the state can get favorable ruling from
the federal government on the tax and ERISA issues noted briefly above
and described in more detail in Professor Zelinsky’s article in this issue.89
States could, of course, design a plan that avoids ERISA
preemption and does not depend on federal tax benefits for its success. As
mentioned in the previous section regarding a federal backstop plan, a state
plan could allow individuals to invest on a post-tax basis, with any gains
then being taxed at capital gains rates when realized. Alternatively, the
state could offer state-tax benefits to attempt to offset, at least in part, the
absent federal tax benefits. For example, a state could exempt from its
income tax retirement savings contributions regardless of whether such
contributions were made to an employer-based or state-based plan.90 While
this would help improve the tax advantage of the state plan, it would not
86

See id.
See I.R.S. Notice 2012-67, 2012-50 I.R.B. 671.
88
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20139 (2013).
89
See generally Zelinsky, supra note 85.
90
While states often adhere to the federal definition of income for tax
purposes, they are of course free to define income for state income tax purposes in
any manner they see fit. For an in-depth discussion of federal-state tax conformity,
see Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity to the Federal Tax Base, 62
DUKE L.J. 1267 (2013).
87
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put participants in the same tax position they would be in if they
participated in an employer plan. A state could, however, offer a state
matching contribution equal to the estimated value of the federal income
tax benefit if the contribution had been made to an employer-plan. Doing
so could put the individual in the same position as she would have been in
if federal income tax law treated employer and individual retirement
savings equally, but it would obviously do so at a cost to state
governments. If a state were to expend money on a retirement plan through
the use of state tax benefits it would likely want to address how to treat
participants in the state plan who move to a different state either before or
during retirement. One possibility would be to have a claw back provision
that would require repayment of the tax benefit upon losing state residency.
On the whole, while states may be good laboratories for experiments in this
area, existing federal law may make it difficult for states to meaningfully
pursue retirement savings improvements.
3. Which Plan Provider?
Regardless of whether the backstop retirement plan was established
at the federal or state level, thought would need to be given to which entity
would most appropriately administer the plan and any investment options.
One approach would be to designate either a governmental agency or an
independent agency to administer the plan. For example, the California
law establishing a state retirement plan for all workers allows the state to
designate CALPERS (the California Public Employee Retirement System)
as the plan administrator.91 Another approach would be to take a free
market approach, and allow any licensed investment firm to offer a
retirement plan structured around legal design and investment
requirements. Providers could also be made subject to basic fiduciary
duties with respect to participants’ accounts. While this option involves
less direct government action than the first proposal, it would also be in
many ways harder to implement, and may cost participants more if fees are
not very closely regulated. If there were numerous providers for these
plans, it would be difficult to auto-enroll participants, unless some entity
wanted to take responsibility of assigning individuals to certain providers.
In addition, it would complicate payroll deduction significantly, given that
employers would be responsible for transferring contributions to many
different providers instead of a single entity.
91

See CAL. GOV’T CODE Sec. 20139 (2013).
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B. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO ALLOW STATE INNOVATION
There may not be political will at the federal level to implement a
backstop retirement plan, and states may be hampered in their reform
efforts by existing federal laws that constrain their options. One available
compromise would be for Congress to amend ERISA to allow state
governments to require automatic enrollment in state retirement plans and
allow employer contributions to such plans without triggering ERISA
preemption. Doing so would significantly broaden states’ reform options.
If this reform is perused, careful thought should be given to whether
ERISA should apply to such state plans and, if so, whether any of its
requirements should be modified.92
In addition to addressing the ERISA barriers to state action,
Congress could also amend the tax code to provide tax benefits for statebased plans that are equivalent to those afforded to private-employer plans.
There would again be the issue of increased cost, but perhaps Congress
would be willing to do so in order to see the results of state-based
retirement plan experiments.
V.

CONCLUSION

The system of retirement savings on which many Americans
currently rely does not generate sufficient capital for most individuals to
adequately replace their income in retirement. While a widespread shift to
401(k) plans has likely contributed to this outcome, this article has
suggested that it is not 401(k) plans per se that are to blame, but rather a
bad combination of flawed individual decision-making and poor employer
plan design. The federal government could take a lesson from the ACA and
create a universally available retirement plan designed to reflect the many
lessons learned from behavioral economics about encouraging retirement
savings. If it is unwilling to do so, it could at the very least make it
possible for states to meaningfully experiment with universal retirement
savings options.
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Historically there has been little political interest in subjecting state
retirement plans to ERISA regulation. See Amy B. Monahan & Renita K. Thukral,
Federal Regulation of State Pension Plans: The Governmental Plan Exemption
Revisited, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 291, 297 (2013).

